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Essays in Macroeconomics and Informality
Gustavo Pereira
While the phenomenon of informality in labor markets is pervasive in many parts of the world,
its interaction with the aggregate behavior of economies is not well understood. In this dissertation,
I explore the connection between informality and the macroeconomy in two main ways. The first
way is to augment a search-and-matching model of labor markets in the tradition of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) with aggregate shocks and an informal sector. The second is to consider
an Aiyagari (1994) setting in which the existence of an informal sector feeds back into the labor
income risk and savings decisions of heterogeneous agents. The parameters of both models are
chosen so as to match features of micro-data I obtain from Brazil. This dissertation is thus divided
into three chapters: the first one presents the data and findings from the empirical exploration. The
second chapter describes the model of informality over the business cycle and presents its results.
The third chapter introduces the heterogeneous agents model with informality and the conclusions
derived therefrom.
The first chapter divides the empirical analysis into two components. Firstly, I analyze how in-
formality is distributed over education, income and occupational groups, and how formal-informal
income differentials behave over these categories. I find that informality decreases in average in-
come, and that the formal-informal income differential is higher among low income workers. The
second component pertains to the evolution of informality over time. I show that, in the time pe-
riod covered by the data, the rate of informality has a strongly cyclical pattern, which is mostly
explained by cyclical variation in formal job creation.
In the second chapter, in co-authorship with Livio Maya, we show in a parsimonious model
of business cycles and informal labor markets that the differential risk of formal and informal
contracts plays a potentially important role in generating the patterns of job creation found in the
data. The main finding is that generating substantial countercyclicality in the informality rate in
our calibration requires the price of risk to be highly countercyclical.
In the third chapter, also in co-authorship with Livio Maya, we show the transition path of a pol-
icy designed to fight informality in a heterogeneous agents setting. The main finding is that while
eliminating the informal sector makes the economy more productive and reduces unemployment
in the long run, the short term impact is influenced by general equilibrium effects. In particular,
unemployment increases in the short run due to the impact of the policy on interest rates. More-
over, the effects of such policy are sensitive to the assumptions on the destination of the extra tax
revenues derived from increased formalization in the transition path.
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Chapter 1
Informal Labor in Brazil: an Empirical Investigation 1
1.1 Introduction
The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that around 60% of the world’s employed
population are in informal employment.2 The same ILO states that “the 2 billion women and
men who make their living in the informal economy are deprived of decent working conditions.”
While there are arguably good welfare properties in the existence of an informal economy, such as
the added flexibility relative to formal activity, the lack of access to social insurance schemes by
informal sector workers and the absence of government monitoring is a reason for concern. Given
the sheer magnitude and ambiguous welfare consequences of the informal economy, understanding
it well in both positive and normative terms is a task of great policy relevance.
An adequate understanding of the informal economy hinges, however, on the data avaiable
for studying the phenomenon. In that sense, informality is a peculiarly complicated topic: since
most informal activity is unmonitored, there are few reliable sources of official data to study the
topic. Most empirical work relies in some way on survey data, in which one asks of workers or
entrepreneurs whether they are “officially registered”. It is therefore not surprising that a number
of papers in the literature, especially those concerned with aggregate implications of some form
(unemployment, trade, output, etc.), rely on a combination of survey data and structural models in
order to derive conclusions about the impacts and desirability of the informal sector and policies
1This chapter is based on the empirical sections of Maya and Pereira (2020b) and Maya and Pereira (2020a)
2See ILO (2018).
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designed to mitigate or eliminate it.3
This dissertation is not an exception. We study a panel of Brazilian households and use our
empirical findings both as motivation and as a disciplining tool for two structural models of infor-
mality. We focus on the case of Brazil because it is largely regarded as a representative emerging
economy with a large informal sector. Conveniently, Brazil has publicly available data that contain
information on informality.
Two of the major sources of data on informality in Brazil are: the “Pesquisa Mensal do Em-
prego” (PME), which used to be the source of official unemployment statistics – going back to
1980 – but was discontinued in 2016, and the “Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
Contínua” (PNADc), available since 2012 and which replaced PME as the offical unemployment
source after its discontinuation. Both surveys have the property of being comprehensive, inter-
viewing a large number of individuals every period, and including questions on informality. While
a number of papers that addressed informality in Brazil were based on PME, the data – especially
before the year 2001 – have several problems, such as: unavailable sample weights for certain
periods, frequently missing basic worker characteristics, input errors due to legacy systems, and
generally poorly documentation. The more recent PNADc is more reliable in terms of data quality
and documentation, but has a shorter time span, which limits its effectiveness in establishing facts
about business cycle.
As PNADc has been less explored by the informality literature, and is relatively more reliable,
we focus on analyzing that survey. That is the main purpose of this chapter. We proceed in two
ways: in section 1.3, we document cross-sectional facts about informality, and in section 1.4, we
focus on time-series facts. These findings are then summarized in the conclusion as a set of five
empirical facts which serve as a basis for chapters 2 and 3.
3For recent influential examples see Meghir et al. (2015) and Ulyssea (2018).
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1.2 Data
We collect all PNADc interviews conducted in the available period, 2012-2019; each surveyed
household is interviewed for five consecutive quarters. That therefore results in data at a quarterly
frequency. Importantly, PNADc provides an identifier that allows us to identify a household in
different quarters but they do not provide an identifier that allows us to identify persons within a
household. In order to overcome that, we use gender and date of birth – or age, when date of birth
is not available – to identify people within a household. The cleaning program, the identification
algorithm, and the attrition analysis are available online.4 The appendix to this chapter contains
relevant summary statistics of our data.
The criterion we use for classifying workers as formal and informal is based on the Brazilian
legislation that requires all employers to sign their employees’ labor booklet, a document that
allows workers to claim legal benefits. One of the questions PNADc asks surveyed participants
is, conditional on the employment, whether their employer signed their labor booklet. We restrict
our sample to non-military, non-civil service, wage earners in the private sector, and classify those
workers who do not have a signed labor booklet as informal. That allows us to tag all individuals in
the sample as one of formal, informal, or unemployed, which we call employment status.
In order to create worker flows, we track whether individuals changed status from one quarter to
the following one.5
Importantly, that classification leaves self-employed individuals out of our sample. While self-
employed people are often classified as informal in empirical work,6 we leave them out of our
sample because our theoretical framework does not properly capture the incentives that drive self-
employment. Our model focuses instead on the workers who experience unemployment and need
to engage in costly search in order to find salaried jobs. Entrepreneurial decisions, such as the one
4The relevant cleaning files are avaialble at github.com/pereiragc/pnad-clean. Please contact us for questions,
suggestions or comments.
5We do not observe whether individuals that maintain labor status remain in the same job.
6Gomes et al. (2020); Leyva and Urrutia (2020); Gerard and Gonzaga (2016); Fernández and Meza (2015);
La Porta and Shleifer (2014); Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012); Bosch et al. (2012)
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to become self-employed, are not adequately captured by our parsimonious framework.
We compute real monthly income in the sample by dividing reported effective labor income
at the main job by the official consumer price index, so that all figures correspond to 2018-Q3
Brazilian currency (“real”). In most of our analyses, we exclude from our sample all individuals
whose reported monthly income exceeds 10,000 Brazilian reals. That corresponds to the 97th
percentile of income, and thus leaves out about 3% of the population. We exclude high income
levels to avoid heavy distortions to income averages provoked by sample outliers.7 In addition, we
exclude from the sample individuals with the age strictly below 18 years of age and strictly above
68 years of age. After these filters, we end up with 7,013,117 individual records for a period of
34 quarters. To compute income statistics, we also exclude from the sample employed workers
with zero labor income or labor status data missing. That results in a total of 4,181,509 income
observations of workers employed in salaried positions.
1.3 Informality and worker heterogeneity
We start by investigating the relationship between personal productivity levels – proxied by
both occupational groups and educational attainment – and rates of informality.8. Besides provid-
ing some control for households human capital level, these groups should also control for the labor
markets workers participate and search for jobs in.
Table 1.1 reports the population shares of each category in the third quarter of 2018. The
educational level can take on three possible values: elementary, high school or higher education.
“Elementary” covers all the individuals for whom educational attainment information is available,
and whose highest completed degree is an elementary school degree or who did not complete
high school. “High school” refers to those who completed all years of high school. “College
or above” refers to those who completed college. The occupational group variable is mainly a
7Whenever this filter is applied, setting the threshold to 20,000 Brazilian reals does not significantly alter our
results.
8Note we only observe occupational groups for employed workers.
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Occupational Group Share (%) Educational Level Share (%)
Agriculture, hunting, fishing 5.32 Elementary or below 40.38
Administrative staff 8.45 High school 41.11
Construction and mechanical 13.71 College or above 18.51
Commerce, services and retail 23.09
Elementary occupations 17.59
Machine and assembling operators 8.78
Managers and directors 3.93
Scientists and intellectuals 10.41
Technicians 7.80
Table 1.1: Occupational Groups and Educational Level: Population Shares
description of the nature of the activity performed by the worker. It is related to industry category,
but not perfectly so. For example, machine operators typically work at the manufacturing industry,
but managers and directors are more evenly distributed across industries. We opt for using the
occupational group instead of industry to have better control over the labor market in which a
worker participates, and not the goods market in which his or her employer does. As opposed to
educational attainment, the use of occupational groups has the advantage of yielding more groups
of households and, arguably, offering a more precise control of the labor market in which they are
inserted.
Finally, because most readers are used to dollar units, we convert Brazilian reals to US dollars
using a conversion rate of 4 Brazilian reals per dollar, a conveniently round number close to the
average exchange rate during the 2017-2020 period, and report statistics stated in currency units
using dollars.
We turn to defining the informality share: the ratio of informal workers to total employed work-
ers. By excluding the unemployed, we avoid additional noise brought by business cycle fluctua-
tions.9 We by documenting how the informality relates to income by computing the informal share
by income quintiles in our sample. Panel 1.1a of figure 1.1 shows the results of our analysis. We
re-calculate the limits of each income bin quarter by quarter. The labels on the x-axis fo the figure
show the limits for 2018Q3. The different curves refer to data from different sample waves, with
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Notes: Panel(a). Points in the x-axis define income quintiles. Each line represents the share of informal workers for different income quintiles. Each
quarter in the sample (2012Q1 - 2020Q1) is associated to a separate line. The thicker line represents 2018Q3. Income quintiles are recomputed for
each quarter, but the labels correspond to the 2018Q3 quintile. Panel (b). The circular markers represent worker groups. The x-axis represents the
average income of each group in 2018Q3. The dashed line plots the forecast of a linear regression of the informality share on average income.
Figure 1.1: Informality Share vs Income
the thicker curve again corresponding to 2018Q3. The numbers reveals that informality is present
over the entire income distribution, but is more prevalent among poorer workers (about 63% in the
first income bin). In addition, the relationship is non-linear: the shares rapidly decline with income
at the bottom part of the distribution, and later stabilize at about 13% of employed workers, a still
significant share of the employed labor force. Notably, these patterns obtain consistently over all
sample periods.
A similar conclusion holds if we condition workers on their educational level and their oc-
cupational group, as shown in panel 1.1b. Each circular marker corresponds to an occupational
group (filled) or an educational level (unfilled). The x-axis position indicates the average income
among employed workers of the corresponding group, and the y-axis its informality share. Both
statistics use data from the 2018Q3 wave. We include the full time series of informality shares
for each group in appendix A.1. It shows that informality is roughly stable over occupation and
education groups, . Back to figure 1.1b, we also show a linear regression forecast curve, calculated
using only occupational group data. The linear coefficient predicts a reduction on the share of
informal workers of about 3.6% for each additional one hundred dollars of average income. The
figure reveals that the informality share is highly heterogeneous across occupational groups, but
never negligible. It varies between about 55% (for farming and fishing) and 15% (for managers
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and directors).
Obviously, the fact that the informality share correlates negatively with income does not im-
ply that informal workers who transition to the formal sector should expect labor income gains.
Proceeding from panel 1.1b, we now ask whether there is an income differential, defined as the
percentage difference between average income among formals and informals in a given groups of
workers, and if there is, what is the size of such differential.
In that respect, we find that an income differential exists and is positive among low-income
workers; among higher-income workers, however, the differential vanishes. More specifically, by
low-income workers we mean workers with income close to the legal minimum wage. In 2018,
Brazilian law established a minimum wage of 998 Brazilian reals per month, or US$ 249.5 using
our conversion rate. Net of taxes, the amount reduces to about US$ 232.10
Figure 1.2 illustrates our finding. Each panel plots income differentials, expressed here as a
percentage of the corresponding average income in the informal sector (for instance, 25% means
that the average labor income among formals is 25% larger than among informals). We again group
individuals in the sample according to their occupational groups (dark bars) and their educational
level (light bars), but this time we add another criterium for grouping them. Panel 1.2a plots the
differential for workers with income below the threshold of US$ 300 (recall the minimum wage of
US$ 232, net of tax). We exclude all the other individuals from the subsample. Panel 1.2b plots the
same statistics for workers with income above the same threshold. We order groups in ascending
order of productivity, proxied by average income (in the entire group sample, not in each income
subsample). Again, we use data from the third quarter of 2018 as a good representation of the
pattern we find for other quarters. You can find the time series of all these statistics in appendix
A.1.11
The two plots reveal a staggering difference in the income differentials across the two sub-
samples. Differentials are substantially higher among workers with lower income (panel 1.2a).
10Personal contribution to the social security system for minimum-wage workers was 7%, and the marginal income
tax rate in the first income bracket is zero.































































































































































(b) Above US$ 300
Figure 1.2: Income Differential
Focusing on these low-income individuals, the differential exceeds twenty five percentage points
for most groups. In addition, the differential declines on the average income of the corresponding
group. As for workers with income above the threshold (panel 1.2b), the estimated differentials
locate closer to zero. In fact, they are all smaller (group by group) than the estimate among workers
below the threshold. More than that, most groups present a number below zero, which indicates
that, on average, informal workers are paid more than formal ones. In addition, the negative rela-
tionship between differential and average income (interpretable as productivity) is no longer there.
These figures provide evidence that informality (or formality) has a different impact on the income
process of different workers.
We believe the minimum wage to be a key factor in accounting for this pattern. Our next
figure, numbered 1.3, plots the histogram of labor income distribution of workers according to
their formality status. We again focus on the 2018Q3 wave. To build the figure, we group workers
in income bins of size 200 dollars each. The x-axis shows the lower limit of the income bin (for
example, the first point corresponds to the bin of workers with monthly income between zero and
two hundred dollars). The relative absence of formal workers in the first bin is not surprising.
As we mentioned, in 2018 Brazilian law established an after-tax minimum wage of US$ 232,
which stays above the upper limit of the first income bin. The minimum wage is therefore a
possible explanation as to why we observe few formal workers reporting labor income gains below
8
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Figure 1.3: Income Distribution of Formal and Informal Workers
the mark of two hundred dollars12. Figure 1.3 also appears to reject - with over forty percent
of informal workers in the 0-200 hundred dollar bin - the hypothesis that informal agreements in
general respect the minimum wage rule. In principle, we could point out to alternative explanations
such as underreporting, but it is difficult to argue why they would not apply to formal workers as
well.
The existence of the legal minimum wage and the evidence that it is an actual constraint only
in the formal sector provide an explanation for the large income differential among low income
workers. This is the exact mechanism we apply in our model to generate such large differentials. It
also provides an explanation as to why they decline with productivity (see figure 1.2a; groups are
ordered in increasing order of average income). The average income of informal workers increases
with group productivity, while that of formal workers is less responsive given that wages are often
set by the legal floor rather than actual firm/job productivity.
12Note that, however reduced, there is a non-zero measure of formal workers in the first bin (reporting to receive
less than the minimum wage). This can be attributed either to underreporting of income, misreporting of formality
status, or to part-time contracts with reduced workday, for which the labor law accepts payments lower than the legal
minimum wage.
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1.4 Informality over the Business Cycle
In order to provide context for the cyclical features of our sample, we begin by reporting the
evolution of the unemployment rate according to our own computations, along with the path of real
gdp growth. For the unemployment rate, and only for it, we report the statistics based on the full
sample of individuals between ages 18 and 67 that reported some form of employment (including
self employed). Both time series are reported in figure 1.4. Note the substantial, persistent increase
in unemployment starting in the last quarter of 2014 accompanied by a sharp contraction in real
GDP. Among the factors that led to the contraction were: political instability, fall in commodity
prices, and sharp fiscal adjustments. In any event, we use the recession in our sample to gather
evidence on the cyclicality of labor market flows involving “ins-and-outs” of employment and
formality, and contrast that with previous findings in the literature.
We turn to analyzing the behavior of the unconditional informality share in the sample. We
compute the share of workers in salaried informal jobs as a fraction of total salaried workers. The
time series for that statistic is displayed on figure 1.5, along with unemployment. For completeness,
appendix A.1 include a version of figure 1.5 with self-employed workers in the sample.
The informality share in our sample is generally high, with a trough of approximately 27% in
2014-Q4. The informal share spikes after the onset of the recession, peaking at around 33% in the
third quarter of 2019. Importantly, as stated above, that share refers to salaried workers and does
not include self-employed individuals. The fact around a third of salaried workers have informal
sector jobs is striking.
The share also displays a strong cyclical movement, correlating starkly with unemployment
in a lagged fashion. The dynamics of the informal share can be broken down into worker flows
involving formality, informality, employment, unemployment, and movements in and out of the
labor force. Guided by our theoretical analysis in subsequent chapters, which does not allow for
search on-the-job or the participation margin, we focus our analysis of worker flows to u → i,
u → f, i → u and f → u transitions (where f denotes formal job, i denotes informal job, and u
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denotes unemployment).
We report the result of two analyses that investigate those flows. Firstly, we construct quarterly
dummies for all those transitions, tagging all individuals for each the current and previous quarter
employment status is available with a 0 or 1. We then compute their (weighted) average by quarter.
The result is shown on figure 1.6. The top panel shows that transitions from formal jobs to un-
employment remain relatively flat throughout the sample period, consistent with large regulatory
costs of separation in the formal sector. On the other hand, the same panel shows a spike in the
separation of informal jobs after the recession period, consistent with a story of lower regulation
costs allowing for the dissolution of unprofitable labor contracts during downturns in the informal
sector.
The flows from unemployment to formal and informal jobs – present in the bottom panel of
figure 1.6 – display interesting patterns. Perhaps surprisingly, at the beginning of the sample the
formal sector absorbs more workers from unemployment than the informal sector. That pattern
reverses near the end of the sample. More importantly for our point, flows to formal are more
strongly cyclical than flows to informal jobs. Transitions from unemployment to formal jobs de-
crease from a peak of around 27% at the beginning of the sample to a trough of around 13% near
the end, whereas transitions to informal jobs display less pronounced decrease, from a peak of
around 20% to a low of around 14%.
Note that the behavior of u → f and i → u flows are the most cyclically pronounced among
the flows under scrutiny. It is important to note that the increased flows from informality to unem-
ployment after the recession onset contribute to the procyclicality of the informal share. In practice,
that means that in order for the informal share to be countercyclical – as evident from figure 1.5,
the flows that work in the opposite direction need to be strong enough to counteract that effect. In
other words, we need the creation of formal jobs to respond even more strongly and persistently to
the business cycle than the separation of informal workers.
In order to have probabilities that might more directly feed into a model with little heterogene-
ity, we also conduct the analysis of regression the transition indicators on individual characteristics
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and time fixed-effects. Due to limited availability of occupation and sector, we focus on gender,
age and education groups (as defined above). The specification is simple,
Trit(s→ s′) = β1Agei +
∑
j∈{l,m,h}




where i denotes the individual identifier, t denotes quarter, and I(·) denote indicator functions. The
variable names are self-explanatory, except for the dependent variable. The left hand side variable
is fixed for a pair (s, s′) denoting the transition type. For example, the variable Trit(f → u)
indicates whether individual i was f on quarter t − 1 but reported unemployment on quarter t.
While previous studies found nonlinear effects of age on informality (see Ulyssea, 2020, for a
survey on empirical findings) we decide for the more parsimonious linear specification.
The appendix reports the β coefficients along with sample sizes and heteroskedastic standard
errors. In summary, we find that the individual characteristics we controlled for and time fixed do
not explain a big chunk of the variation in the worker flows. That points to substantial heterogeneity
stemming from variables we do not observe (for example, job tenure).
The values of the time fixed effects in our specifications with all characteristics are present in
figures 1.7 and 1.8. All coefficients are estimated precisely to large sample sizes. The number of
observations in each quarter is presented in the appendix.
The time fixed-effect coefficients tell a similar story as 1.6. Starting from figure 1.8, we observe
minimal variation in the fixed-effect coefficients associated with formal separations (bottom panel).
That is in sharp contrast with informal separations (top panel), which nearly double from trough to
peak. That points to more flexible informal contracts being severed during the downturn. Similarly,
figure 1.7 points to a similar pattern as 1.6, with flows of workers from unemployment to formality
taking a larger and more persistent hit than flows to informality. Flows to informality are also
affected negatively, but they recover faster than their formal counterpart.
The main finding from our analysis is that in the 2015-2016 recession episode, the share of
informal workers increased substantially, driven in most part by a sharp contraction in transitions
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from unemployment to formal jobs. That pattern is similar to the one found by Bosch and Maloney
(2008) and Leyva and Urrutia (2020) in Mexico, and by Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) in Brazil
using a different survey.
Together, Figures 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 indicate that the cyclicality of the formal labor market is
driven by hiring whereas the cyclicality of the informal labor market is driven by separations.
That is in line with the mechanism Maya and Pereira (2020a) propose for the cyclicality of the
informality share, which is the topic of the next chapter of this dissertation. Upon the arrival of a
recession, a large number of informal employers with labor contracts at the margin of profitability
exercise the option to freely separate. Formal employers who are also near that margin are not able
to do that, due to the costs of laying off workers arising from regulations such as the large severance
pay requirements. The bad aggregate shock reduces the incentive to open any new vacancies,
driving down overall job creation. However, due to the countercyclical regulatory burden, those
new vacancies that open are biased towards informality. As we argue in the next chapter, the
cyclicality of regulatory by themselves would not affect the relative value of formal and informal
contracts sufficiently to justify such a pronounced difference between formal and informal hiring.
In our next chapter, we elaborate on a possible explanation: the fact that formal contracts become
riskier due to regulation, and a countercyclical price of risk.
1.5 Conclusion: five empirical facts about informality in Brazil
In this chapter, we documented several facts about informality in Brazil in the period between
2012 and 2019. We derived those facts by analyzing a recent database that to our knowledge has
heretofore only been explored in the context of informality by Gomes et al. (2020), who focus
specifically on labor income risk. Relative to previous empirical work on informality that relied
solely on the Brazilian “Pesquisa Mensal do Emprego”, the database we use compares positively
in the general reliability of the data (reflected, for example, in the quality of matching individuals,
and the availability of individual characteristics). The fact that we obtain comparable results in our
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sample adds a further piece of evidence to those findings.
Below we restate our findings as five empirical facts that hold in our sample, and which we will
refer to in our theoretical analysis in the following two chapters.
Fact 1.1 The informality share is large among workers in all regions of the income distribution.
It’s larger at the bottom, but also significant at the top.
Fact 1.2 An income differential exists and is positive among low-income workers. Among higher-
income workers, the differential vanishes.
Fact 1.3 Informal workers transition to unemployment more often than formal workers.
Fact 1.4 The cyclicality of informal employment derives from the transitions into unemployment
from informality.
Fact 1.5 The cyclicality of formal employment derives from transitions into formality from unem-
ployment.
Fact 1.1 is widely regarded as a stylized fact for emerging countries and connects to several
previous papers, most prominently La Porta and Shleifer (2014) and Meghir et al. (2015). Fact 1.2
finds its closest relative in Bargain and Kwenda (2014), who document a higher formal-informal
pay gap for low earners using a quantile regression approach. While Engbom and Moser (2018)
address the connection between minimum wages and informality, they focus on the employment
and hours, while our finding pertains to income. Fact 1.3 also obtains in other samples, such as
the one studied by Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) and Leyva and Urrutia (2020). One of its
implications is a lower duration (in the Finance sense) for informal contracts relative to formal
ones, which is a central topic in Chapter 2, as well as Leyva and Urrutia (2020). Facts 1.4 and 1.5
have also been documented elsewhere, namely, by Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012), Leyva and
Urrutia (2020), and Bosch and Maloney (2008). They are central to the motivation of Chapter 2.
Our findings mostly revisit and confirm previous findings in the literature, and, taken together,
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serve as a starting point for our theoretical explorations conducted in the subsequent chapters of
this dissertation.
There is still much more work to be done in order to better understand the phenomenon of
informality. In particular, while empirical work on the topic is inherently challenging, the relation-

































Notes: The top panel shows year-over-year quarterly real GDP growth, extracted
from the Ipeadata website. The bottom panel shows the results of our own calcu-
lations for unemployment in our sample, filtering out only ages outside the range
[18, 67], but keeping all people with a valid employment status (including self-
employed, civil service, military, etc.). No filters are applied to the unemployment
series. Highlighted in blue on both panels is the sample period used for most of
our calculations.















































































































Informality, Risk Premia, and the Business Cycle 1
2.1 Introduction
The share of workers in informal jobs in developing countries comoves negatively with the
business cycle. That fact has been documented by a large body of research and appears to hold
for many countries, sample periods and is robust to alternative definitions of an informal job.2 The
typical interpretation of that stylized fact is that it provides evidence of the role of informality as
a buffer against unemployment in countries where formal job opportunities are scarce. This view
made its way into structural work in informality either by modeling informal work as frictionless
self-employment in a low productivity activity, or as work in a separate sector with abundant
job opportunities due to low regulatory costs. Either way, workers avoid income losses from
unemployment by working informally.
In this paper, we offer an complementary view of informality that can also explain the counter-
cyclical nature of the share of informal workers (henceforth simply “informal share”). Our main
idea is that some of the rules and regulations that fall upon employers in the formal sector impose
a burden that covaries with the business cycle. Consider for example the requirement of severance
pay. If the magnitude of severance pay is sufficiently high, there exists a large range of possible
realizations for aggregate shocks such that a firm finds it optimal not to terminate a contract that
1This chapter is based on the theoretical and computational sections of Maya and Pereira (2020a).
2See Bosch and Maloney (2008), Fernández and Meza (2015), Alcaraz et al. (2015), Leyva and Urrutia (2020)
in the case of Mexico. In Brazil, the same fact is documented by Bosch and Maloney (2008), Ulyssea (2010) and
Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012). In Colombia, see Mondragón-Vélez et al. (2010), Fernández and Villar (2016). See
Loayza and Rigolini (2006) for cross-country analyses.
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has a negative net present value. Within that range, the worse the aggregate shock, the bigger the
losses incurred by the firm. In the case of informal employers, the option of costlessly laying off a
worker is a form of insurance against that aggregate risk.
The presence of a countercyclical burden reduces the value of hiring formally in recessions
even if all agents in the economy are risk neutral. However we find that merely replicating the
cost structure of formality and its cyclicality in a quantitative model is not sufficient to generate
a countercyclical informal share. We are only able to obtain a countercyclical informal share by
letting the price of risk be sufficiently countercyclical. We find that to be in striking similarity with
conclusions from the asset pricing literature dating back at least to Campbell and Shiller (1988).
In order to generate a sufficiently large rebalancing of job creation towards (less risky) informal
labor during a recession, we need to assume enough variation in discount rates.
Our technical approach in the paper is to use a combination of data and a structural model. We
draw from chapter 1, where we analyze a Brazilian household panel in the period between 2012
and 2019, which contains one large contraction in output and employment. There, we find that the
informal share to increase substantially after the onset of the contraction, adding one more piece
of evidence the stylized fact we started from. That recession coincides with a reduction in the
transitions of unemployed workers to both formal and informal jobs, and we also find the reduc-
tion in flows from unemployment to formal jobs to be much more pronounced than the informal
counterpart.
We use moments obtained from the data to inform a search and matching model of the labor
market with informality and aggregate uncertainty. The model includes two sources of counter-
cyclical burden on formal jobs: large severance payments and a reduced degree of wage flexibility
relative to informal jobs. We allow agents in the model to discount future payoffs with a flexi-
ble, exogenously specified stochastic discount factor, partly informed by data from the Brazilian
financial sector. That specification has the advantage of being tractable and nesting assumptions
on discounting commonly used in prior literature. We show in a quantitative exercise that in the
absence of a time-varying price of risk, the model predicts the informal share to be procyclical, in
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the sense that medium and long run responses of the informal share to contractionary aggregate
shocks are negative. With the arrival of a negative shock, separations in informal sector jobs spike.
Separations in the formal sector remain flat, due to large regulatory costs. The increase in informal
separations has the effect of bringing the informal share down on impact. Job creation in both
sectors decreases, and while new matches are more likely to be informal, that is not quantitatively
sufficient to revert the effect of the large mass of separations.
Allowing for time-variation in the price of risk reverses that conclusion. In that case, the
arrival of the negative shock still causes the spike in informal separations, bringing down the in-
formal share on impact. However, the greater price of risk exacerbates the impact of the negative
shock on formal job creation, in line with the intuition laid out above. When the price of risk is
sufficiently sensitive to the business cycle, the reduction in the hiring of formal workers relative
to informal ones is large enough that the informal share quickly overtakes the steady-state level,
slowly reverting in subsequent periods.
We also study the impact of two policies under different values of the parameters that govern the
cyclicality of the price of risk. We begin by simulating an increase in the monitoring probability of
new matches. When a new match gets monitored, the firm cannot offer an informal contract, having
then to choose between a formal one or to not offer a contract at all. We increase the monitoring
probability so that the mean level of informality shrinks by half, going from 30% of the employed
population to around 15%. For all parameter combinations, the model predicts output to increase,
and unemployment to become less volatile and less persistent, though slightly higher. On the other
hand, the informal share becomes more volatile and covaries more negatively with unemployment.
The other policy we investigate is a reduction of severance requirements. We find that in or-
der to shrink informality by half, one needs to reduce severance requirements in about 80% when
there is no time-variation in the price of risk (TVPR). Once we allow the price of risk to be coun-
tercyclical, the same reduction in severance payment requirements achieves a greater reduction
in informality. That happens through an amplified impact on the relative likelihood of finding
a formal job. That points to a greater sensitivity of the level of informality to severance policy
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relative to the constant price of risk specification. Moreover, different assumptions about TVPR
also generate different predictions about the behavior of unemployment volatility after the change
in severance policy. With a sufficiently countercyclical TVPR, the policy causes unemployment
volatility to increase. When TVPR is shut down altogether, reducing severance payments has the
effect of reducing unemployment volatility.
2.2 Related literature
Recent literature has sought to understand the causes and implications of a large informal sector
through the lens of structural models. Meghir et al. (2015) estimate a wage posting model with an
informal sector using steady-state moments from Brazilian micro-data. Their estimation exercise
seeks to realistically capture worker flows and the distribution of wages in the formal and informal
sector. They find that an increase in enforcement on informal firms reduces unemployment and
increases welfare. Ulyssea (2018) proposes a model that allows for an intensive margin of infor-
mality, and where fixed costs of operating and firm scale play a key role in determining the size of
the informal sector. He estimates the model by targeting moments concerning the cross-sectional
distribution of informality over firm size. He finds that increasing enforcement on the extensive
margin of informality leads to a reduction in welfare. In a separate paper (see Maya and Pereira,
2020b), we highlight the role of transitional dynamics in the evaluation of policies that seek to
repress informality, incorporating the fact that from the perspective of the household, labor income
is more risky for informal employment – a fact that is also documented by Gomes et al. (2020), and
more recently Engbom et al. (2021). All those papers build into their models different perspectives
on informal activity and highlight their policy implications.
While this paper is concerned with understanding the nature of informal activity, it differs from
the above body of work in that it focuses on business cycle dynamics. The dynamics of infor-
mality over the business cycle has been the topic of an extensive literature. Restrepo-Echavarria
(2014) shows how excess consumption volatility in emerging markets can be partly explained by
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the presence of an unmeasured informal sector. She considers a small open economy (SOE) model
in which labor freely moves between a competitive market for formal hours and a self-employment
technology. Fernández and Meza (2015) document stylized facts about informality in Mexico and
use their empirical analysis to inform an SOE model with informality. They find that the inclusion
of an informal sector amplifies the impact of growth shocks, a mechanism that arises due to the
imperfect pass-through of shocks from the formal to the informal sector. In both models, infor-
mality behaves as a buffer to which labor frictionlessly reallocates. In that sense, informality in
their model resembles self-employment, which we abstract from in our model and empirical anal-
ysis. Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) document the cyclical properties of worker flows between
unemployment and jobs in both sectors, as well as flows between sectors. They build a search
and matching model with informality where both sectors are subject to search frictions. Their
theoretical framework is the closest to ours. Relative to their paper, we abstract from transitions
between informal and formal jobs, focusing instead on flows to and from unemployment. We also
relax their assumption of constant discount rates and show the quantitative importance of doing so.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to highlight the role of risk to employers in
explaining the cyclical movements of informality and to draw attention to the connection between
informality and the price of risk.
The idea that hiring workers can be seen as a risky investment has been the topic of recent
developments in the macro-labor literature. In the context of the United States, Hall (2017) incor-
porates a reduced-form discount factor estimated from stock market data into a labor search model
and shows that it generates a realistic volatility of labor market variables, therefore mitigating the
Shimer (2005) puzzle. Kehoe et al. (2019) also take on the Shimer puzzle in a similar setting by
considering several formulations for the stochastic discount factor that generate realistic patterns
of asset prices. They are able to amplify the cyclicality of labor market variables by interacting a
time-varying price of risk with human capital accumulation on the job. Borovička and Borovičková
(2018) provide restrictions that stochastic discount factors must satisfy in order to rationalize the
labor market fluctuations observed in the data, given the volatility of expected cash flows. Our pa-
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per does not attempt to solve the Shimer puzzle. Instead, we draw on the analogy between hiring
and risky investments and use it to explain empirical patterns pertaining to informality.
In conceptual terms, the contribution of Leyva and Urrutia (2020) is the closest to ours. They
consider a model with search frictions in the formal sector, but interpret informal sector work as
frictionless self-employment. They also allow for movements in and out of the labor force, as well
as shocks to international interest rates (that are similar in spirit to shocks in the risk free rate that
we consider in our model). They find that the shocks to the international interest rate are key in
producing realistic predictions for the dynamics of job creation. They therefore provide evidence
to the view that financial frictions matter for the business cycle of emerging markets – which has
gained traction since the work of García-Cicco et al. (2010) – and that financial frictions matter for
informality.
The connection between international interest rates and informality comes from the fact that
formal jobs have a “higher duration” than informal self-employment, as observed in the data on
the much lower transitions from informality to unemployment relative to the formal counterpart.
The lower duration of informal jobs makes their value less sensitive to variations in the risk free
interest rate compared to formal jobs, and that is precisely the finding of Leyva and Urrutia (2020).
Relative to their work, we also allow, and find evidence for, a connection between higher duration
of formal contracts and their sensitivity to interest rates. However, our assumptions also allow
us to study the role of “differential risk” of formal and informal job opportunities, and, in our
calibration, that channel has higher relevance in bringing the model close to the data.
2.3 Theoretical framework
In this section, we develop a model that highlights the differential risk profile of formal and
informal jobs, and that allows for discount rates as well as the price of risk to vary over the business
cycle. The backbone of our model is a search and matching of unemployment with endogenous
separations, similar in spirit to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). We add formality choice in that
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setting following Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012, 2015), and time variation in discount rates and
the price of risk comes from an exogenously specified affine stochastic discount factor.
As in the typical search and matching setting, our model concerns the extensive margin of
employment. There is a continuum of workers that at each point in time can have one of three
possible labor market states: unemployed (u), formally employed (f), or informally employed (i).
Employed workers supply a fixed amount of hours, which we normalize to unity. Unemployed
workers transition to employment by meeting with vacant jobs, a process that is modeled in a
simplified fashion by assuming an exogenous matching function. Production in this economy has
constant returns to scale, and a free-entry condition determines the creation of vacancies in our
economy.
We assume that vacancies and unemployed workers are identical, but every match is ex-post
heterogeneous due to the draw of an idiosyncratic productivity shock. After the shock is observed,
the firm has the option of offering a formal contract, an informal one, or to leave without offering
a contract. If the firm chooses to be formal or informal, it cannot change its formality status in
future periods. We set up the payoff structure of formal and informal contracts in such a way that
the model predicts contract offering policies to satisfy a cutoff rule: for sufficiently low draws of
the productivity shock, the firm chooses not to offer a contract; for intermediate values, the firm
offers an informal contract, and the firm chooses to offer a formal contract when the match draws
a high enough shock.
We capture aggregate risk in the economy by means of a shock that multiplies all firms’ pro-
ductivities in a given period. The interaction of the aggregate shocks with the cutoffs described
above will drive the cyclicality of the informal share in our model. The time varying nature of the
risk free rate and the price of risk will be key in explaining this interaction.
2.3.1 Model description
We cast the model in discrete time. Each time period is divided into two subperiods: (i) the la-
bor market stage and (ii) the production stage. In the labor market stage, new matches are formed,
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and ongoing matches decide whether to separate or not. In the production stage, new matches and
those ongoing matches that did not dissolve in stage (i) engage in production. Consumption takes
place after production, at the end of the period.
New matches are formed as follows. Vacancies and unemployed workers meet randomly ac-
cording to an exogenous matching function M(u, v) = auηv1−η. After a vacancy and a worker
meet, the match draws an idiosyncratic productivity level zt ∼ F̄ , which follows the Markov
process below in subsequent periods,
zt+1 =

z̃t+1 with probability λ
zt with probability 1− λ
(2.1)
where z̃t+1 ∼ F̄ are iid. We take F̄ to be the CDF of a log normal distribution with parameters ν
and σ2z , where ν is normalized so that
∫
zdF̄ (z) = 1. The idiosyncratic match productivity process
is thus fully specified by λ and σz, which capture respectively the persistence3 and dispersion of
the process. The aggregate component of productivity {yt} satisfies an auto-regressive process in
logs,
log yt+1 = ρ log yt + σyεy,t+1 (2.2)
where {εy,t+1} is iid and satisfies εy,t+1 ∼ N(0, 1). Parameters ρ and σy capture respectively the
persistence of aggregate productivity and the dispersion of innovations.
After new matches observe the draw of the first idiosyncratic shock, firms have the option of
offering a formal contract, an informal one, or to leave without offering any contract. Not offering
a contract has the value of zero.4 Formal and informal contracts pay dividends according to
πf(z, y;w) = zy − w(1 + τ) (2.3)
πi(z, y;w) = zy − w − (1− α)z (2.4)
3Higher values of λ imply lower persistence.
4Alternatively, one could assign the discounted value of being in the vacancy pool next period. That is irrelevant
in this case because of free entry condition (2.13).
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where z is idiosyncratic productivity, y denotes the aggregate shock, and w is the wage paid to the
worker. Informal contracts have a productivity penalty of (1 − α) ∈ [0, 1] that scales only with
the idiosyncratic shock, but not with the aggregate one. This parameter summarizes in a simplified
fashion the empirical fact that, conditional on worker observables, workers in the informal sector
are less productive than their formal counterparts. It captures factors such as potential fines from
government monitoring, lower scale and selection into low productivity activities. To capture tax
avoidance by informal firms, the tax rate τ only appears in the expression for formal dividends.
Ongoing matches have the option to separate. As will be detailed in a later part of this section,
firms and workers renegotiate wages every period, and separation happens when no wage can make
the surplus of both parties positive simultaneously. Importantly, whenever a formal match is dis-
solved, the firm must transfer a fixed amount χ to the worker. This captures the legal requirement
of severance pay present in many countries with a large informal sector, and it is a key parameter
for our theory. We do not allow for severance pay when informal matches separate.5
All agents in this economy discount one-period-ahead payoffs according to the exogenously
specified, affine stochastic discount factor (henceforth SDF)
logQt,t+1 = −r − µ1 log yt − 12λ
2
t − λtεy,t+1 (2.5)
where r is a steady-state risk-free rate, µ1 is a parameter that allows for time variation in the risk
free rate, and λt captures a potentially time-varying price of risk. The expression for λt is
λt = γ0 + γ1 log yt (2.6)
where γ0 introduces a constant risk premium, and γ1 controls the extent to which the price of
aggregate risk λt reacts to the contemporaneous value of the aggregate shock, yt. This one of
5We could not find empirical evidence in favor or against the existence of (voluntary) severance payments in
informal matches. We believe the more realistic assumption would be the existence of positive but relatively small
firing costs for informal firms, not necessarily a transfer to the worker. For parsimony, we do not include that in the
model.
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the specifications considered by Kehoe et al. (2019) and is a common assumption in the finance
literature.6 We defer a detailed discussion of the exogenous SDF to section 2.3.5. We are now in a
position to rigorously define the problem of firms and workers.
To alleviate notation, we break down the problem of a matched firm of type s ∈ {f, i} into
their value at the search stage, Js(y, z), and the at the production stage, Πs(y, z). We also consider
Π̃s(z, y;w) the value of a firm at production stage taking as given the current wage w. We begin
by describing the latter value function,
Π̃s(z, y;w) = πs(z, y;w) + Ey′|y
{






The firm that decides to produce when facing wage w gets current dividends, plus the discounted
value of continuing. The continuation value depends on the draw of the idiosyncratic shock, and
the possibility of separation is incorporated in Js.
We defer a discussion of wage determination to a later point in this section, but it is convenient
to introduce the wage function ws(z, y) that results from that process. That allows us to state the
value of a firm at the production stage,
Πs(z, y) = Π̃s(z, y;ws(z, y)). (2.8)
The value at the labor market stage of a formal firm is
J f(z, y) = max{−χ,Πf(z, y)} (2.9)
and similarly
J i(z, y) = max{0,Πi(z, y)} (2.10)
in the case of the informal firms. We denote by δf(z, y) ∈ {0, 1} and δi(z, y) ∈ {0, 1} the policy
functions arising from (2.9) and (2.10).
6List references here: Cochrane and Piazzesi, Ang and Piazzesi, etc.
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At the point of entry, after observing the idiosyncratic shocks, firms decide which type of
contract to offer, or to not offer any contract. That decision is denoted by ς(z, y), and satisfies
ς(z, y) = arg max{Πf(z, y),Πi(z, y), 0} ∈ {f, i,n} (2.11)
where of course ς = f means a formal contract is optimal, ς = i means an informal contract is
optimal, and ς = n means it is optimal to offer no contract.7
Let u and v denote respectively the measure of unemployed workers searching for jobs, and
vacancy openings. We denote by θ = v/u the market tightness. Given our random matching

















In order to search for a worker, vacancies must pay a cost κ. When market tightness is θ, the
value of searching for a worker is given by




(1− φ) max{Πf(z, y),Πi(z, y), 0}+ φmax{Πf(z, y), 0}
}
dF̄ (z)
+(1− q(θ))Ey′|y[Q(y, y′)V (y′)]
(2.12)
Vacancies entail a flow cost κ. With probability q that depends on market tightness, the vacancy
meets a worker and draws an idiosyncratic shock z, choosing afterwards which kind of contract to
offer, if it chooses to offer a contract. The firm can only offer an informal contract with probability
(1 − φ). The parameter φ is interpreted as the probability of a monitoring shock that occurs after
the shock is observed and forces the firm to choose between a formal contract or no contract. With
probability 1− q, the vacancy goes to the next period unfilled.
We assume that vacancies enter up to the point where the value of a vacancy is zero at every
7We resolve ties numerically in favor of production vs. non-production, and in favor of formal vs. informal.
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max{Πf(z, y), φmax{0,Πf(z, y)}+ (1− φ)Πi(z, y), 0}dF̄ (z) = κ (2.13)
We now turn to the problem of the worker. The flow value of unemployment is b. Workers
are hand to mouth and discount monetary units according to the same SDF Qt,t+1. The present
discounted value of a job of type s ∈ {f, i} given wage w is simply





[δs(z′, y′)U sep,s(y′) + (1− δs(z′, y′))W s(z′, y′)]dF̄ (z′|z)
}
(2.14)
where we use the conditional notation F (z′|z) for simplicity. In the continuation value above,
δs denotes the indicator of separation; W s(z′, y′) = W s(z′, y′, ws(z′, y′)) incorporates the bar-
gained wage; and U sep,s(y′) is the value of unemployment, possibly accounting for a severance
payment, as described below.
The value of an unemployed worker at the production stage – when no severance pay is due –
is given by








′,y′)(z′, y′)dF̄ (z′) + (1− p(θ(y′)))U(y′)
]}
(2.15)
the function p(θ) = aθ1−η is the probability that a worker meets a vacancy implied by the matching
functionM . The worker rationally expects the job to be of type ς(z′, y′), in accordance with (2.11).
Having defined the value of unemployment, we can recover the value of separating from a formal
job: that is simply U sep,f(y) = χ + U(y). Separating from an informal job has the same value of
unemployment, U sep,i(y) = U(y). It is important to remember the assumption that workers that
lose their jobs cannot search the same period.
Inspired by Tortorice (2013), we adopt a protocol for wage determination in which the pre-
vailing wage is a convex combination between the outcome of Nash bargaining and a wage norm.
That allows us to capture potentially different degrees of wage flexibility for formal and informal
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contracts. Let ŵs(z, y) be the outcome of Nash bargaining, with disagreement points being respec-
tively the value of separation U sep,s for the worker, and the value of a vacancy for the firm. Since
the value of a vacancy is zero in equilibrium, Nash bargaining prescribes
ŵf(z, y) = max
w∈Bf(z,y)
[
W̃ f(z, y;w)− U sep,f(z, y)
]β
[Π̃f(z, y;w) + χ]1−β (2.16)
ŵi(z, y) = max
w∈Bii(z,y)
[
W̃ i(z, y;w)− U sep,i(z, y)
]β
Π̃i(z, y;w)1−β (2.17)
where the constraints Bs(z, y) for s ∈ {f, i} essentially impose that the surplus must be non-
negative for both parties involved in the bargain. In the event that Bs(z, y) = ∅, we set ŵ(z, y) to
satisfy W̃ (z, y, ŵ(z, y)) = U sep,s(z, y). Since Bs(z, y) = ∅, that implies Π̃f (z, y, ŵ(z, y)) < −χ,
which necessarily triggers a separation according to (2.9) and (2.10). When Bs(z, y) 6= ∅, one can
show that an interior solution to the problem necessarily exists.
Whenever separation is not optimal, the prevailing wage is a convex combination of ŵs and the
wage w̄s(z) that implements Nash bargaining in a deterministic steady state (i.e., when yt ≡ 1).
The expression for wage determination is then
ws(z, y) = ψsw̄s(z) + (1− ψs)ŵs(z, y) (2.18)
The parameter ψs governs the degree of wage stickiness – in the sense that higher values of ψ
imply a more dampened response of wages to movements in the aggregate shock. It is possible
that ws(z, y) falls out of the set of feasible wages Bs(z, y). If ws(z, y) is higher than the highest
wage that the firm is willing to accept, we reset it to the firm’s indifference threshold numbers.
Conversely, if ws(z, y) is so low that the worker strictly prefers to be unemployed, we reset it to
the indifference wage for the worker.
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2.3.2 Model timing
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of period t, all agents observe the
aggregate shock yt. Subsequently, for ongoing matches:
1. Idiosyncratic shock z is revealed
2. Wage renegotiation takes place; when no wage brings about positive surpluses for worker
and firm, match dissolves
3. Surviving matches engage in production.
The events in the search stage have the following timing:
1. Vacancies and unemployed meet
2. Nature draws idiosyncratic match shock
3. Firm decides between offering formal contract, informal contract, or leaving
4. Formal and informal contracts produce.
At the end of the period, agents consume the output due.
2.3.3 Equilibrium definition and solution method
Throughout our analysis, we focus on recursive equilibria of this economy in which the value
and policy functions described above do not depend on the distribution of agents over match pro-
ductivities and employment states. A recursive equilibrium in this economy consists of time in-
variant value functionsW – comprising all the value functions defined on section 2.3.1 – as well
as the policy functions ς , δf , δi, the bargained wages wf , wi, that solve equations (2.7), (2.8), (2.9),
(2.10), (2.11), (2.13), (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.18), given the stochastic process for aggre-
gate shocks (2.2), the exogenous stochastic discount factor (2.5), and the market tightness map
θ(y).
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Let m0(z, s) be an initial distribution of households over idiosyncratic states and labor market
status at the end of a period (therefore after separations and search occur), with s ∈ {u, f, i}.
We can compute the evolution of that distribution given a history of shocks yt = {yτ}, im-
plied the shock structure and the policy functions from the recursive equilibrium. Denote that
by mt(z, s;m0), where for notation simplicity we omit the particular history of aggregate shocks.
Then we can define the ergodic measure m∗(z, s;m0) = E[mt(z, s;m0)], and it follows from an
ergodic theorem that there exists m∗(z, s) such that







for almost every history {yτ} and initial measure m0.
As the model is very non-linear, we compute numerical approximations to the equilibrium and
the ergodic measure. For that, we use a Rouwenhorst (1995) method in order to discretize the
aggregate auto-regressive shock, and approximate the Log Normal idiosyncratic shock discretely,
with grid points having equal weights. The equilibrium approximation is then computed with value
function iteration.
2.3.4 Model mechanisms
In this section, we illustrate the main decisions that take place in our setting. They are essen-
tially the decision of which contract to offer, and the decision to terminate a contract. Throughout
this section, we use the value and decision functions we obtain numerically from the baseline
calibration, as described in sections 2.3.3 and 2.4.1.
Firms that enter each period need to decide which contract to offer the contacted unemployed
worker. That is done in accordance with equation (2.11), which is illustrated in Figure 2.1. In
that figure, the aggregate state is fixed at the steady state level and the value functions Πf(z, 1)
and Πi(z, 1) are represented respectively by the dashed and dotted line. The points z such both
functions are below zero are such that no contract is offered. For intermediate values of the id-
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Notes: Dotted line represents z 7→ Πi(z, 1). Dashed line represents z 7→ Πf(z, 1).
Figure 2.1: Determination of contracts
iosyncratic shock, it is optimal to offer an informal contract. The formal contract is offered when
the productivity is high enough. Note that for informal firms, the threshold that determines whether
the firm offers no contract or an informal contract is the same as the one for the termination of on-
going contracts. That is not the case for formal firms. The severance pay parameter χ introduces
a disconnect between the point at which the firm becomes indifferent between offering or not a
contract – which in Figure 2.1 happens somewhere between z = 1 and z = 1.5 – and the point at
which it is optimal to terminate the contract, which happens slightly to the left of the first bar. That
disconnect is essential for our mechanism. The fact that the margin for entering is different than
the margin for separation in the case of formal firms means that there will be a positive mass of
firms that oscillate in equilibrium between positive and negative value depending on the value of
the aggregate shock.8
One important factor regarding contract choice is that, due to the monitoring shock, a fraction
φ of the contracts in the intermediate z region becomes formal even though it would be optimal
to offer an informal contract. That parameter is important for avoiding a selection effect. If there
was no monitoring, all new formal contracts would occur only at the very top of the distribution of
8It is important to keep in mind for this argument that there is sufficient persistence in the idiosyncratic shock to
reason from the perspective of a fixed z.
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Notes: Dotted line represents y 7→ Πi(1, y). Dashed line represents y 7→ Πf(1, y).
Figure 2.2: Firm value and aggregate shocks
idiosyncratic shocks, unless a very low parameter for the informal contract productivity α were to
be chosen. That would anyway imply a disjoint set of productivities for new matches associated
with formal and informal jobs, in contradiction with the existing empirical evidence (see La Porta
and Shleifer, 2014; Meghir et al., 2015; Ulyssea, 2018).
One way of thinking of Figure 2.1 is that it illustrates the determination of contracts in the
steady-state. It does not touch our main concern in this paper: the impact of aggregate shocks.
Aggregate shocks affect the model in two main ways: (i) ex-ante vacancy creation, and (ii) shifts
in the above curves. Channel (i) concerns variations in market tightness in response to aggregate
shocks, and it is the topic of a large literature since the paper by Shimer (2005). Kehoe et al. (2019);
Hall (2017); Borovička and Borovičková (2018) all demonstrate how changing the assumptions on
discounting – relative to stochastic discount factors based on risk neutral or CRRA assumptions –
can help generate realistic movements in market tightness over the business cycle. This paper is not
concerned with this type of variation. We are focused on channel (ii): how changes in discounting
affect the split between types of contracts, conditional on vacancy creation. In other words, while
the aforementioned papers focus on portfolio value, this paper focus on portfolio weights.
We illustrate the variations of firm value given possible values of the aggregate shock in Figure
2.2. It shows the value of ongoing jobs at the median idiosyncratic shock point. A formal firm
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with a median idiosyncratic shock has negative value, meaning it would like to dissolve the match,
but due to the presence of large severance payments, this is not feasible. For informal firms, the
option of separating costlessly – which appears in Figure 2.2 as the flat part near the lower region
of aggregate shocks – works as insurance against bad realizations of the aggregate shock. That is
the key reason why formal contracts are risky: bad realizations of the aggregate shock (low εy) are
more correlated with negative value due to the effective lack of the option to separate.
In order to illustrate how profits of formal and informal firms correlate with the business cycle,
and the role of the severance pay requirement, we compute profit trajectories of formal and infor-
mal firms. We pick z = 0.8422 for formal firms and z = 0.78 for informal firms, which generate
similar cash flow levels when y is at the steady state level, and are low enough that the contract
is near the margin of separation for the informal firm. We then 200 possible histories of length
T = 15 for the aggregate shock,9 starting at two different levels: steady state and three standard
deviations below steady state.
Figure 2.3 shows the results. Panel (a) contains the profit trajectories when the aggregate shock
starts at the steady state level. Note that many trajectories in the informal case have jumps to zero,
indicating a separation. That does not happen in the case of the formal firm. When we start from
the bad shock, we see the trajectories in panel (b). The negative shock causes profits to decrease,
but the large cost of separating forces the firm to remain with the unprofitable trajectories. The
same does not hold for informal contracts. For many histories of the aggregate shock, the contract
optimally separates and the profit jumpts to zero.
Together, those graphs show that informal contracts are less exposed to aggregate risk due to
the option to separate. When the price of risk gets higher during downturns, the lower exposure to
aggregate shocks translates into a higher value relative to formal contracts. This is why vacancy
creation will relatively favor informal contracts during a recession.
9Since new idiosyncratic shock arrives with probability λ = 0.0645 in our calibration, that simulation length is
close to the average duration of an idiosyncratic shock.
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2.3.5 Discussion on the ad-hoc stochastic discount factor
Our model allows for endogenous job destruction and heterogeneous matches, which are two
sources of technical complications absent from other papers in the intersection between asset pric-
ing and macroeconomic models of the labor market, such as Kehoe et al. (2019) and Hall (2017).
While Kehoe et al. (2019) include human capital accumulation, they devise the structure of the
model so that human capital aggregates and hence they do not have to keep track of the distribu-
tion, but only the average value of human capital. That allows them to easily compute aggregate
consumption and to use stochastic discount factors that obtain from standard preferences in the
Asset Pricing literature, such as Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
In our case, computing aggregate consumption at any period requires knowledge of the dis-
tribution of workers over idiosyncratic productivity and labor market states, (z, s). If we were to
make the stochastic discount factor endogenous, we would need to work with Bellman equations
such as
Vt(z, s, y) = π(z, s, y) + E{Qt,t+1Vt+1(z, s)} (2.20)




where Ct is aggregate consumption. However, in order to compute total consumption, one needs
the distribution of households in order to aggregate wages wf(z, y), wi(z, y), profits, and unem-
ployment benefits. On the other hand, these variables are outcomes of problems such as (2.20).
The distribution of workers becomes another state variable, which renders this particular problem
nearly impossible to solve.
An exogenous stochastic discount factor allows us to circumvent that technical complica-
tion. Moreover, to our knowledge all papers on informality that employ search models make
the assumption of risk neutral discounting, which is a particular case of our specification with
10In here we assume that agents belong to a continuum of families that share risk through a complete market for
one period contingent claims.
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γ0 = γ1 = µ1 = 0. In that sense, we are not giving up generality with respect to for example
Albrecht et al. (2009), Meghir et al. (2015), Narita (2020), Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) and
Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2015). Other examples of papers that use exogenous stochastic discount
factors include Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) and Bianchi et al. (2018) in the International
Macroeconomics literature.
2.4 Quantitative exercise
We now calibrate the economy described in section 2.3 based on the empirical analysis pro-
vided in chapter 1. We begin with an economy with a risk premium that does not feature a time
varying price of risk. The parameters of the stochastic discount factor are chosen to match facts
about the financial market in Brazil, namely: (i) the average interest of savings accounts, which we
take to be a proxy of the risk free rate in Brazil, (ii) the volatility of that interest rate, and (ii) the
sharpe ratio from Ibov, the main benchmark index in Brazil. The average interest rate is directly
set by the parmeter µ0. The volatility of the risk free rate is implied by the stochastic discount
factor via
rt = Et[− log(Qt,t+1)],
whose variance can be estimated using the invariant distribution of the discretized aggregate shocks.
We calibrate γ0 to equate the Sharpe ratio from our sample with the implied maximum Sharpe ratio
from the SDF model, σt(logQt,t+1).11
The main result from that exercise is that the baseline specification with a constant price of risk
fails to generate counter-cyclicality of the informal share. We then introduce gradually introduce a
time varying price of risk in this economy by changing γ1, adjusting the parameter γ0 so as to keep
the implied Sharpe ratio constant. In essence, what we do is to change the conditional volatility of
the SDF under the constraint that the implied maximum Sharpe ratio remains constant.
The exercise shows that the correlation between unemployment and the informal share is in-
11The bound on the Sharpe ratio follows from straightforward manipulations. A detailed discussion can be found
in Campbell (2017).
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creasing in |γ1|. Moreover, the higher countercyclicality of the informal share is driven by a sharper
response of hiring of formal workers, and a less pronounced response of separations of informal
workers. These findings confirm the intuition that introducing a countercyclical price of risk re-
duces the incentives for hiring formal workers in recessions, and show quantitative relevance of
this channel, provided that the extent of countercyclicality of the price of risk is large enough.
2.4.1 Calibration
We set the payroll tax τ = 0.3, an approximation of statutory rules in Brazil. The target for
severance pay is based on the Brazilian legislation, which prescribes a severance pay that is a
function of tenure and the history of wages. Brazilian law requires that every month, employers
deposit an amount that corresponds to 8% of the employee’s compensation into a government run
account which is linked to that worker. If the firm fires the worker, it must pay the worker an
amount equivalent to 40% of the total deposits made to that account.12 In order to approximate
that, we target the following relationship:
χ = 0.08×mean duration of formal contract × 0.4× average formal sector wage
The mean duration and the average formal sector wages we use when computing the target are the
model implied ones.
We take the worker’s bargaining weight and the elasticity of the matching function to be 0.5,
following Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012). We set ψf and ψi, the parameters governing frictions
in wage adjustment on both sectors, to be respectively 1 and 0. That captures an informal sector that
adjusts wages entirely in accordance with Nash bargaining, and a formal sector in which wages
do not adjust after aggregate shocks – with the exception of readjustments that avoid inefficient
separations. We set the mean risk free rate r equal to the average monthly interest rate on savings
deposits, r = 0.6%.
12Note that the amount is not withdrawn from the account. It is paid above and beyond what is already there.
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Symbol Interpretation Source/Target Parameter value
Shocks
ρ Aggregate shock persistence Unemployement autocorrelation 0.78
σy Aggregate shock st. dev. Unemployement volatility 0.045
λ Idiosync. shock arrival rate Formal separation probability 0.065
σz Idiosync. shock dispersion Formal TFP dispersion 0.54
Informality
α Informal contract productivity Average informality rate 0.7125
φ Monitoring probability Ratio of finding rates ≈ 1 0.67
ψf Wage norm (formal) Rigid 1.0
ψi Wage norm (informal) Flexible 0.0
Labor Market
χ Severance payment Legislation 3.85
τ Payroll tax Legislation 0.30
b Unemployment flow value Informal separation probability 0.299
κ Vacancy cost Market tightness = 1 0.40
a Matching function efficiency Unemployment rate = 14.6% 0.23
η Job-finding rate elasticity Literature 0.5
β Worker’s bargaining weight Literature 0.5
Stochastic discount factor
r Steady state risk-free rate Average savings account rate 0.006
µ1 Risk-free rate: time variation Volatility of savings account rate 0.037
γ0 Risk price: constant term Maximum sharpe ratio 0.09
γ1 Risk price: time variation - 0.0
Table 2.1: Baseline Calibration
Parameters ρ, σy, λ, σz, α, φ, χ, b, κ, a, µ1, γ0 are set jointly to target the 12 moments shown in
Table 2.1. The aggregate shock parameters ρ and σy are set to match the persistence and volatility
of unemployment observed in the data. The parameters governing the idiosyncratic shock σz and
λ target respectively: the distribution of formal TFP that we infer from estimates by Meghir et al.
(2015), and the rate of separation of informal workers.
Parameters α and φ govern the productivity of informal firms and the monitoring of new con-
tracts. They affect informality in different ways. Parameter α works mainly by changing the slope
of z 7→ Πi(z, y), so that for example a reduction in α would have the effect in Figure 2.1 of reduc-
ing the value where the two lines intersect, thereby reducing the distance between the bars which
determine the region of idiosyncratic shocks where it is optimal to offer an informal contract. Con-
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ditional on the productivity thresholds that determine optimal contracts, parameter φ controls the
fraction of new informal contracts that are forced to either formalize or leave. When φ = 0, the
split between new formal and informal contracts is entirely based on productivity via a cutoff rule.
In that case, generating a sizable informal sector requires setting a sufficiently high productivity
punishment 1 − α, which makes informal firms particularly susceptible to separations given id-
iosyncratic shocks. In order for the unemployment rate to be stable, that implies a high probability
of landing an informal job relative to a formal job. We take advantage of this insight and set α and
φ to target the mean informal share, and the ratio of new formal jobs to new informal jobs. In the
data, that likelihood ratio of landing an informal job is close to 1, even though it varies strongly
over the business cycle.
Parameter χ follows the legislation target discussed above. The flow value of unemployment
b targets the separation rate of informal workers. Parameters κ and a set average market tightness
equalt to one and the mean value of unemployment to that observed in the data.
Parameter µ1 targets the volatility of the risk free rate and γ0 sets the maximum Sharpe ratio to
the Sharpe ratio obtained from the Ibovespa index relative to the savings deposits. We set γ1 = 0 in
our baseline specification, and in section 2.4.2 we compare that with alternative values that allow
for a time varying price of risk.
In order to compute model implied moments, we construct a large history for the aggregate
shock and use the model implied average for the considered statistics. Because the model is fairly
non-linear and requires a large number of grid points for precision, each run (equilibrium plus
measure) takes about six seconds. That renders the use of a derivative based solver for the cali-
bration unfeasible. We use a simulated annealing algorithm to minimize the Euclidean distance
between data and model moments. The value of calibrated parameters in our baseline specification
are shown in Table 2.1. The model and data implied moments are shown in Table 2.2. Overall, de-
spite the high degree of nonlinearity, the large number of moments and parameters to be matched,
we obtain a reasonable fit.
We turn to evaluating different specifications for the time varying price of risk in terms of their
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Moment Model Data Calibrated parameter
Average unemployment 14.3% 14.6% a
Unemployment autocorrelation 0.9206 0.907 ρ
Unemployment volatility 0.029 0.037 σy
Share of informal workers 0.3087 0.303 α
Separation probability (f) 3.02% 2.8% λ
Separation probability (i) 7.23% 8.9% b
Finding f / Finding i 0.93 1.08 φ
Interquartile ratio TFP (f) 68.6% 70.3% σz
Tightness 1.02 1 κ
Implied severance pay 3.85 3.8 χ
Sharpe ratio 18.71% 18.44% γ0
Risk free rate volatility 0.41% 0.34% µ1
Notes: Worker separation probabilities, volatility of risk free rate, Sharpe ratio and unemploy-
ment volatility are converted to quarterly so as to match data frequency. “Finding f / Finding
i” denotes the probability of transitioning from unemployment to a formal job divided by the
probability of transitioning from unemployment to an informal job.
Table 2.2: Model fit
ability to match the observed cyclicality of the labor market variables in the data.
2.4.2 Simulations: the role of a time-varying price of risk
In this section, we present the results of our main simulation. We consider an increasing the
degree of time variation in the price of risk, adjusting γ0 – the steady state price of risk – to keep
the Sharpe ratio constant. The parameters we use are the following:





All other parameters remain unchanged. Table B.1 in the appendix shows the effect of the
changes in parameters on the values of the moments that were targeted in the baseline case.
The main message is that the business cycle averages do not move much in response to the
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reparametrization. As we will show, the constancy in averages hides important changes in business
cycle features of the different specifications.
We construct impulse response functions (IRFs) to a negative three standard deviation aggre-
gate shock on all of the four economies above. The way we construct the IRFs is the following.
We start from the ergodic measure m∗(z, s), then simulate the paths of five thousand histories for
the aggregate shock of length T = 30, all of which start from three standard deviations below the
steady state value. We then take the average over stories of each of the aggregate variables in the
model.
The response of unemployment to the negative shock is shown in Figure 2.4. The different
assumptions on risk premia are represented by different shades of gray. Darker lines correspond
to a higher degree of time variation in prices of risk, and the units are percentage points deviations
from the steady state value. Even though we calibrate a relatively volatile aggregate shock, the
responses of unemployment are small. A model with a flexible informal sector and endogenous
separations does not generate a large volatility of unemployment, in spite of our deviation from
typical Nash bargaining in formal jobs, and the relatively high value of the standard deviation of
aggregate shocks obtained in our calibration.
The lowest response of unemployment to the aggregate shock happens when the SDF features
the highest degree of time variation in the price of risk. This is not in contradiction with the findings
of Kehoe et al. (2019) because, in addition to a countercyclical risk price, those authors find that
human capital accumulation on the job needs to interact with the more conditionally volatile SDF
in order to generate an emprically valid response in unemployment.
The focus of this paper, however, is not on fixing the Shimer puzzle, but on understanding the
relationship between the cyclicality of risk prices and the informal share. In Figure 2.5 we show
the response of the informal share to the same shock on aggregate TFP under different assumptions
about risk prices. On all scenarios, the share of informal workers drops on impact. As we will see,
that reflects a large but temporary increase in the dissolution of informal contracts. The darkest
line, corresponding to the highest value of γ1, features the smallest impact decline of the informal
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Standard Deviation
Variable Data γ1 = 0 γ1 = −0.2 γ1 = −0.8 γ1 = −1.6
Share of informal workers 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.007
Separation f 0.055 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.004
Separation i 0.224 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.021
Finding f 0.026 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002
Finding i 0.0177 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.019
Table 2.3: Standard deviations: data and model
share, and in that case the informal share increases above the steady state value ten months after
the shock. For the lower values of the price of risk, the informal share does not go significantly
above the steady state value.
We turn to investigating what drives that pattern. To do so, we also compute the response of
flows to and from unemployment. The flows from unemployment to formal and informal jobs are
the content of Figure 2.6. Increasing risk price countercyclicality causes transitions to formal jobs
to worsen, and transitions to informal jobs to improve. That is exactly the exactly the effect we
anticipated: while vacancy creation generally decreases, the new vacancies that are posted tilt in
favor of hiring informal workers. That illustrates the mechanism we propose. For a sufficiently
high time variation in the price of risk, the downturn reduces the value of formal workers more
than informal ones because they are more risky.
As in the data, the model also predicts separations in the informal sector to increase after the bad
shock. That is evident in Figure 2.7: while separations of formal workers remain nearly unchanged,
on all specifications the model predicts separations of informal workers to initially spike. That
effect is large, but short lived relative to the flows of workers from unemployment to employment.
Another noteworthy finding is that increasing time variation in the price of risk reduces the rate of
informal separations. The reason for this is that the behavior of the risk premium has the effect
of reducing the average wage in the informal sector, as well as making it more responsive to the
business cycle. Because wages lower with the negative shock, fewer matches need to separate.
Tables 2.3 contains the standard deviation of relevant aggregates, obtained through a stochastic
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Correlation(Variable, Unemployment)
Variable Data γ1 = 0 γ1 = −0.2 γ1 = −0.8 γ1 = −1.6
Share of informal workers 0.71 -0.165 -0.094 -0.145 0.495
Separation probability f 0.64 -0.036 -0.039 -0.015 0.143
Separation probability i 0.95 0.173 0.164 0.165 0.121
Job finding f -0.96 -0.691 -0.678 -0.592 -0.293
Job finding i -0.85 -0.702 -0.692 -0.613 -0.354
Table 2.4: Correlations with unemployment: data and model
simulation with fifty thousand periods. For low values of γ1, the model predicts the informal share
to present little variability, around a fourth of what is observed in the data. With the highest value,
the variability increases, slightly surpassing the data. The variability of the separation of informal
workers is also nearly matched in that case, in contrast with lower values of γ1. All models fail to
generate sufficiently variable finding rates for formal workers.
In Table 2.4 we report the correlation of aggregates with unemployment in the data and in the
stochastic simulation. Adding time substantial variation to the price of risk brings the correlation
of the informal share with unemployment to around 50% from the -16.5% obtained when γ1 =
0. The channel highlighted in the impulse responses presented in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 are not
immediately translated in to the correlation between unemployment and worker flows to and from
unemployment. The reason is that the presence of the informal sector and the kinks generated by
endogenous separations make the model highly nonlinear, so that positive and negative aggregate
shocks have asymmetric effects. While the impulse response functions focus on negative shocks,
the ergodic simulations used to compute 2.4 contain information from both contractionary and
expansionary aggregate shocks. In that sense, the sample and the data are not entirely comparable.
In summary, the quantitative exercise shows that increasing countercyclicality in the price of
risk causes the absorption of workers from unemployment to tilt towards informal jobs after a
recession. That effect is strong enough to generate a positive response of the informal share in the
medium run to a negative aggregate shock. That is in contrast to the case where we assume an
acyclical risk price, where the response of the informal share is more negative on impact and does
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not revert back to steady state levels until nearly two years after the shock.
2.4.3 Counterfactual analyses
We now turn to investigating the policy implications of a counter-cyclical price of risk in our
model of informality. Our approach is to compare stochastic steady states under different policy
parameters, hence we do not make claims about transition dynamics.13 The point of the exercise
is not only to study the predicted effects of different policies, but to understand how different
specifications affect those predictions. We are interested in the consequences of misspecifying the
channels that drive business cycle movements in labor market variables.
We compare two different policies in terms of their outcomes on labor market variables: in-
creasing government monitoring and lowering severance requirements. We set both policies so as
to reduce the size of the informal sector by half in the baseline specification, and repeat the exercise
on all specifications for the stochastic discount factor. We find that predictions for both policies
differ substantially.
Effects of increased monitoring
In this section we compare equilibria where the monitoring probability of new contracts φ
increases from 68% to 85% so as to halve the informality rate in the baseline specification. We
report the outcome for a subset of aggregates in Table 2.5. The same parameter change reduces the
informal share by about the same amount in all specifications.
The first salient outcome is that unemployment also increases following the increased moni-
toring, irrespective of the calibration. There are two effects taking place. On the one hand, more
workers can find formal jobs, which last longer due to a lower separation rate. That brings down
the rate of unemployment. On the other hand, some firms that would offer informal jobs under
lower monitoring do not find it worthwhile to offer a formal contract and instead decide to go back












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to the vacancy pool. The decrease in new informal job opportunities more than compensates the
increase in average job duration due to a greater proportion of formal workers. In spite of the
increase in unemployment, output increases after monitoring for all specifications. The fact that
formal firms do not pay the productivity penalty, and that employment is now more concentrated
on those firms, more than compensates for the higher number of unemployed workers.
All calibrations predict an increase in government revenue following from the greater moni-
toring. That increase is muted by the fact that the greater rate of formality is biased towards less
productive firms, hence in regions of the idiosyncratic shock that have lower associated wages.
Also, tax revenues are predicted to be more procyclical, except when γ1 = −1.6. All specifica-
tions predict tax revenues to be about equally volatile before and after the policy.
For this particular policy, different assumptions about the price of risk do not generate markedly
different predictions. In that sense, this policy is robust to that particular type of model miss-
specification. One important caveat about this policy is that we assume costless monitoring. In
reality, the amount of government resources required to monitor the extensive margin of formality
might be large. The is especially true given the fact that informal jobs tend to be more common
in smaller firms, which might be harder to monitor. The correct way to interpret our result is
therefore that if the (unmodeled) marginal cost of increasing monitoring is low, increasing it will
have benefits in terms of output and revenue collection without much loss in terms of increased
unemployment or its volatility, regardless of whether countercyclical risk prices play a role in the
economy.
Reducing severance pay
We now implement the reduction in severance payment requirements needed in order to achieve
the same outcome of halving the informality rate in the baseline specification. That implies reduc-
ing the severance payment parameter by around 80%, from χ = 3.85 to χ = 0.89.
All specifications predict unemployment to increase after the policy. That is a direct con-
sequence of increased separations of formal contracts, which becomes cheaper when severance
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requirements are lower. That reduces the average duration of formal contrats and hence the aver-
age unemployment rate. The effect is compounded with the marked increase in the separation of
informal workers. All specification predict increases in output and its volatility, more so than with
increased monitoring. That effect is the most pronounced for the highest |γ1| case.
The first and perhaps most striking difference between specifications concerns the prediction
about the effect of the policy on the informal share itself. While in the baseline specification the
informal share shrinks by half, the same change in the severance requirement causes the informal
share to shrink to 7.3% in the highest |γ1| case. The reason for that can be inferred by the relative
behavior of separation rates and finding rates between formal and informal jobs. While the impact
of the severance requirement on separations is relatively similar in all economies, the ratio of new
formal jobs to new informal jobs is starkly larger in the case with the most variable price of risk. I
compute those ratios below:
Ratio of new f jobs to new i jobs
Calibration Before policy After policy
γ1 = 0 0.92 3.22
γ1 = −0.2 0.92 3.11
γ1 = −0.8 0.90 2.9
γ1 = −1.6 1.14 7.25
In the economy with highest |γ1|, reducing the severance requirement has a much larger impact
than in the other cases in terms of the ratio of new formal jobs to new informal jobs. That translates
into an informal share more than fifty percent lower than the one predicted by the models with
lower variation in the price of risk.
Another difference between specifications that is salient from Table 2.6 is the behavior of un-
employment volatility. On all economies, except the one with the highest |γ1|, the volatility of
unemployment decreases after the policy. That conclusion reverts for γ1 = −1.6. That reflects
a more pronounced cyclicality in both job finding and job separation in the formal sector follow-
ing the policy. That difference in cyclicality has consequences for the volatility and cyclicality
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of tax revenues. While tax revenue volatility remains nearly stable in the previous policy exer-
cise, changes in severance requirements have an effect of doubling the tax revenue volatility in the
baseline specification and nearly tripling it when γ1 = −1.6.
Our results indicate that lowering severance requirements would bring the economy to a region
where it is more sensitive to the price of risk. That is not in contradiction with the mechanism
we propose. There are two sources of countercyclical burdens that make formal workers risky:
severance payments and wage rigidity. What this exercise shows is that with the lower severance
requirement, the imperfect adjustment of wages in the formal sector plays a relatively stronger
role in determining the cyclicality of the labor market variables. Put differently, the relatively high
severance requirement in the baseline economy dampens the amplifying effect of wage rigidity.
In terms of insurance, a reduced magnitude of severance payments has two effects. On the one
hand, it lowers the insurance of each individual formal worker. On the other hand, it increases cov-
erage due to the increased fraction of formal workers. The fact that we do not take a stand on how
risk is shared between different economic agents in the economy prevents us from meaningfully
addressing the welfare trade-off between the extensive and intensive margin of insurance provided
by the severance payment. We leave that important question for future research.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we addressed the stylized fact that the rate of informality correlates negatively with
the business cycle. We focused on one episode from recent Brazilian history, in which informality
spiked after a sharp recession, driven mostly by reduced flows from unemployment to formal jobs.
Our main contribution is to interpret this event through the lens of a search and matching model
of the labor market in which discount rates used to bring future cash flows to present value reflect
a time varying price of risk. Our paper is the first to consider that the higher risk of hiring workers
formally interacts with a countercyclical price of risk. In recessions, when the price of risk is high,








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We calibrate the model, targeting moments from the Brazilian economy, and we show this
channel to be quantitatively relevant in explaining the episode observed around the 2015-2016
recession. We analyse policy implications of our proposed channel. We find that policies aimed at
reducing the rate of informality have potentially different outcomes under different specifications
discount rates. While in the case of a constant risk price a reduction in the severance pay policy
aimed at halving the rate of informality reduces the volatility of unemployment, that conclusion
reverses if the price of risk is sufficiently countercyclical.
Recent literature has shown that the discounting behavior of economic agents matters for the
cyclical behavior of labor market in the United States. Our findings expand the reach of that
conclusion, suggesting that the dynamics of labor markets in developing economies is also affected
in important ways by the behavior of discount rates.
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Notes: Each gray line represents a possible trajectory of period profits given a history of shocks
y1, y2, . . . , y15. At time 0: aggregate shock at steady state value. X-axis is time. Y-axis units
are consumption goods. Negative values denote period losses. Dashed lines denote the mean
over the 200 histories.
(a) Aggregate shock at steady state value
Notes: Each gray line represents a possible trajectory of period profits given a history of shocks
y1, y2, . . . , y15. At time 0: aggregate shock three standard deviations below steady state. X-
axis is time. Y-axis units are consumption goods. Negative values denote period losses. Dashed
lines denote the mean over the 200 histories.
(b) Negative aggregate shock
Figure 2.3: Trajectories of period profits
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Notes: Time period is a month. Units are percentage points relative to the steady state. Each
line represents a different parameter combination. Darker lines correspond to higher time
variation in the price of risk.
Figure 2.4: Response of unemployment to aggregate shock
Notes: Time period is a month. Units are percentage points relative to the steady state. Each
line represents a different parameter combination. Darker lines correspond to higher time
variation in the price of risk.
Figure 2.5: Response of informal share to aggregate shock
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Notes: Time period is a month. Left figure shows transition rate from unemployment to formal
jobs. Figure on the right shows transition rates from unemployment to informal jobs. Units
are percentage points relative to the steady state. Each line represents a different parameter
combination. Darker lines correspond to higher time variation in the price of risk.
Figure 2.6: Response of unemployment to employment flows to aggregate shock
Notes: Time period is a month. On the left, transition rates from formal jobs to unemployment.
On the right, transition rates from unemployment to informal jobs. Units are percentage points
relative to the steady state. Each line represents a different parameter combination. Darker
lines correspond to higher time variation in the price of risk.
Figure 2.7: Response of employment to unemployment flows to aggregate shock.
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Chapter 3
The Repression of Informal Labor: Aggregate Effects and Transition
Dynamics 1
3.1 Introduction
In its Recommendation No. 204 (2015), the International Labour Organization (ILO) defines
the informal economy as “economic activities by workers and economic units that are (...) not
covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements and does not cover illicit activities (...)”
(ILO (2015)). The definition highlights the main property of informal activity: not being registered
with legal authorities. Follows from such property the fact that agents involved in informal activity
have increased ability to avoid different forms of regulation2, and thus face an economic environ-
ment significantly affected by it. Workers have access to job opportunities in firms that might not
exist if forced to formalize, at the cost of reduced participation in social security programs that re-
quire formal employment for benefit entitlement. Firms can avoid production costs stemming from
taxation and regulation (minimum wage, severance payments). Governments have their ability to
raise tax revenues compromised as businesses can opt for hiding their operation and not paying
taxes.
The ILO’s Recommendation provides not only a definition of informal activity but guidance to
member countries to promote and facilitate the transition of the informal economy into a formal
economy, under the justification of potential economic gains of such a transition. We can often
find similar propositions debated among policymaking circles, usually under arguments, among
1This chapter is based on the theoretical and computational sections of Maya and Pereira (2020b).
2See, for example, Almeida and Carneiro (2012).
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Source: International Labour Organization
Figure 3.1: Informal employment as share of non-agricultural employment (2015)
others, of protection of workers’ rights and gains in productivity. These arguments coincide with
the "parasite view" of informality, the idea that informal firms crowd the labor market with low-
quality jobs and prevent workers from finding better ones in the formal sector. The parasite view
has also gained recent support in the academic literature, in research papers such as Meghir et al.
(2015) and Dix-Carneiro et al. (2019).
Motivated by the significant size of the informal sector in many emerging market countries
- see figure 3.1 for ILO evidence - and the potential consequences for households’ welfare and
public finances, in this paper we examine the economic effects of public policies that succeed
in repressing informal activity. We build a heterogeneous-agent macro model with incomplete
markets in which households choose consumption and savings levels, and face a stochastic stream
of income. Interest rates are endogenous and clear the capital market, as in Aiyagari (1994).
The distribution of income shocks is not exogenous in the model. It follows from a standard
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) search model in which firms can opt between hiring work-
ers formally and informally. We select model ingredients so that it can reproduce some of the
properties of the joint distribution of income and informality in Brazilian household-level micro
data, as explored in Chapter 1. In that chapter, we derived five empirical facts, out of which three
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will be relevant to this chapter. First, there is a significant presence of informal workers (about
30%) in all regions of the income distribution. While informality is more prevalent at the bot-
tom of the distribution (low income workers), it is also present at economically significant levels
among high-income workers3. Second, the income differential, defined as the difference in av-
erage income earned in the formal and informal sectors, is large among low-income workers, in
particular those workers with earnings close to the legal minimum wage prevailing in Brazil. How-
ever, such differential declines and even vanishes among those with higher income, to which the
minimum wage is not a constraint. This pattern is true after controlling using proxies for human
capital and the labor market in which these workers are inserted. The third fact is that informal
workers transition to unemployment more frequently than formal ones, which builds on the idea
that informal jobs are more unstable and, thus, less desirable from the point of view of workers.
Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) study this pattern in detail using a different Brazilian dataset and
find similar conclusions.
Our observation about income differentials - the second fact above - suggests, first, that min-
imum wage laws and/or personal reservation wages play a significant allocative role in the labor
market and, second, that either the inverse relationship between firm productivity and informality
(as documented in La Porta and Shleifer (2008) and La Porta and Shleifer (2014)) is less than
perfect or the relationship between firm productivity and worker’s wage is less than perfect. These
two ideas underlie some of the main assumptions in our search model. In it, formal contracts
must observe a minimum wage, common across all groups of firms and workers. The minimum
wage introduces a critical non-linearity in human capital: doubling everyone’s productivity does
not result in doubled labor income and equal unemployment. We also allow workers to search for
new hiring opportunities on-the-job, an important tool to have individuals of higher skill level to
accept minimum wage offers - another pattern observed in the data. A key innovation of our search
model, designed to generate the same pattern of income differential observed, is that we introduce
firm heterogeneity in their “ability” to hire informaly, or hiding ability. This layer of heterogeneity
3See La Porta and Shleifer (2008) and Meghir et al. (2015) for additional evidence.
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captures different potential costs of not formalizing labor contracts. The source of these differ-
ences might include (but are not limited to) geographical location, proximity to public vigilance,
firm size and reputational costs. In the model, firms with higher hiding ability choose to offer
informal contracts even for highly productive workers, which helps to generate low income gaps,
while firms with lower hiding ability and/or productivity keep the size of informality in check.
We make assumptions that render the equilibrium in the search block of the model uniquely
determined given a path for the interest rate. The search block then yields a distribution for the
households’ income process. With it, we can calculate the solution to the households’ optimization
problem, which we solve using standard dynamic programming techniques. Households’ utility
then provides a measure of personal economic welfare sensitive to income risk, which plays a
significant role in our results and represents a departure from most informality literature. Search
models in their majority, and ours is not an exception, assume a risk-neutral worker. His or her
value function amounts, in all, to the present discounted value of the stream of current and future
income. This is a convenient assumption that not only delivers tractability, but also allows for
proper use of intuitive bargaining schemes, such as the so-called Nash bargaining solution. How-
ever, as a measure of actual economic welfare, it ignores the element of risk, for changes in the
income distribution that result on the same average income lead the model to predict identical lev-
els of welfare. For this reason, we do make use of the risk-neutral worker’s value to base his or her
decisions in the search model, which keeps tractability and comparability with previous research,
but we do not make welfare inferences based on such measure.
We calibrate our model so that in the baseline equilibrium we observe the same facts observed
in the data. We then proceed to simulate the repression of informality by the government. We
model such fight by changing the distribution of hiding abilities: new firms lose any ability to
operate informally. To a large extent, the economy’s response to the policy change underscores the
"parasite" character of informality and thus agrees with the recent literature. Lacking the option of
circumventing costly regulation, unproductive firms refrain from posting job vacancies and open
space in the labor market for more productive ones. Average labor income increases. In addition,
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as formal jobs last longer, the average duration of employment spells increases. On the other hand,
the value of vacancies decline, less firms populate the labor market and job-finding rates decline.
Which effect dominates for determination of the unemployment rate depends on where we look at
in the transition path. In the short run, our simulation points to an increase in the unemployment
rate; in the long run, a decrease.
Such differences along the transition path relate to general equilibrium effects, in particular
equilibrium in the capital market, often ignored in the analysis of informality. In our baseline sim-
ulation, capital demand increases as firms hire more efficiency units of labor. Aggregate savings
do not and, in fact, decline in the initial periods following the beginning of the fight against in-
formality, as consumption-smoothing households decrease savings in anticipation of higher future
income and reduced marginal value of wealth. Market clearing then requires a significant increase
in interest rates (up to 4% annually) in the short run and therefore a reduction in the discounted
present value of firms’ profits. By free entry, less firms opt to post vacancies and we observe higher
unemployment. In the long run, as aggregate savings catch up, the interest rate declines back to
levels near the original steady state and unemployment decreases.
We also look at welfare. Despite these undesirable short-run general equilibrium effects, we
find significant welfare gains for almost all groups of households in our baseline exercise. These
gains - often surpassing the mark of 20% of pre-repression lifetime consumption - take place in
the short as well as in the long run. They are smaller, however, among unemployed workers and
households with low wealth, a results that lines with the fact that negative income shocks (another
expression for unemployment) become more traumatic events, given that returning to employment
is less likely.
Having a baseline result, we look at two similar policies again designed to repel informality. In
the first, government adjusts its budget constraint not by reducing income taxation - as it is the case
in the baseline simulation - but simply by increase public consumption. We show that, in this case,
interest and unemployment rates increase in the short and in the long run. Aggregate savings do
not recover as before and the effect on interest rate persists. This contributes to a more pronounced
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decline of job-finding rates and, consequently, an increase the unemployment rate. The result holds
even with the assumption that formal jobs are inherently of longer duration. In terms of welfare,
gains are not as pronounced as before, seldom exceeding 15% of lifetime consumption, but remain
positive for most groups of households. We do observe however that, in the long run, unemployed
households with low wealth are worse off.
In the second policy sensitivity study, we consider the case that economic agents anticipate
the repression of informality in five years. The endogeous selection of productive firms does not
start immediately, as entrant firms still have the possibility of hiring informally. However, inter-
est and unemployment increase starting at the announcement of the policy, for the same reasons
described above. In fact, we observe an output contraction before policy implementation along
with an increase of informal activity that follows from higher income taxes. These higher taxes
also contribute to a short-run reduction in average household income. In terms of welfare, these
effects lead to more losers from the policy in the short run (a little less than 20% of the population).
Losing households, once again, tend to be those with low net wealth, thus reduced capacity of self
insuring, at the time of the policy announcement.
3.1.1 Literature
Informal labor is gaining increasing attention from researchers. The existing literature com-
prises empirical, theoretical and quantitative papers that focus on the role of firms and/or workers.
We do not provide a complete review of the literature (see Ulyssea (2020) for that). Instead, we
highlight some the papers that we believe to be more connected to the points we make in this paper.
The work in La Porta and Shleifer (2008) and La Porta and Shleifer (2014) provides an overview
of the competing theories of informality: the romantic view (as in De Soto (1989)), the parasite
view (supported by more recent paper described below) and the dual view. The authors present
evidence to support the dual view. It states that informal firms are less productive (smaller, inef-
ficient, run by poorly educated entrepreneurs), they can’t compete with formal ones and they are
largely disconnected from the formal economy. Our framework allows us to differentiate between
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"parasite view" firms and "dual view" firms. Ulyssea (2018) provides a model with intensive and
extensive margin of informality (firms size vs formal status composition) that successfully unifies
the three theories in a single framework. Due to government auditing, the marginal cost of labor
of informal firms grows more rapidly than that of formal ones. This feature links firm size to labor
and firm formality.
Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2015) develop a wage-posting model with productivity-heterogeneous
firms and homogeneous workers in which informal firms crowd the labor market and make it harder
for workers to find the better, formal jobs. The model reproduces the overlapp of productivity levels
in the formal and informal sectors seen in Brazilian firm-level data. Given productivity, informal
jobs pay higher wages to compensate for lost benefits. Tighter enforcement leads to a distribution
with more productive firms in the new equilibrium and higher welfare. We find the exact same
pattern, but predict a short-run phase of higher unemployment that follows from general equilib-
rium effects in the capital market. We also identify groups of households that can be harmed by
tighter enforcement. In recent work, Dix-Carneiro, Goldberg, Meghir, and Ulyssea (2019) study
the effects of openness to international trade on informality, and find similar predictions in terms
of productivity and welfare as informality shrinks. Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) focus on tran-
sition rates. They study a search model in which ex-ante homogeneous workers and firms decide
to sign a formal or informal contract upon a match. They estimate the model to replicate Brazilian
data job-finding and job-destruction rates, and show that it can successfully reproduce the main
cyclicality patterns of unemployment, formality share and transition rates. In a later article, Bosch
and Esteban-Pretel (2015) use a similar model to study the effects of unemployment benefits on
formality and unemployment. Granda and Hamann (2015) provide evidence that informal individ-
uals and households in Colombia present a higher savings rate than formal ones. In their model,
labor and capital markets are fully segmented between formals and informals, unlike our model.
Albertini and Terriau (2019) provide evidence from Argentina of informality rates, as well as job
finding and separation rates, over the life cycle. They use a model with endogenous educational
level choice - an important absence of our framework in which human capital is fixed - and a
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household free choice condition between formal and informal labor markets (equal expected value
between sectors) to reproduce the stylized facts.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
We now turn to developing a quantitative model capable of reproducing the properties of in-
come dynamics and informality we documented on Chapter 2. In this section, we present such
model. The agents are: a one-sized continuum of heterogeneous households, heterogeneous firms,
a government and a representative investor. Time is discrete and there is no aggregate uncertainty.
The commodities of the model are: a homogeneous final good, physical capital, labor hours and
a one-period, risk-free bond that promisses the payment of one unit of final good in the following
period. Markets are therefore incomplete. Let qt be the price of bonds.
Each household contains a worker and a shopper. Shoppers purchase final goods for consump-
tion and bonds as a form of saving. They make their choice to solve a standard consumption-
savings problem, which we present directly in recursive form for brevity. The shopper state is
(a, s), where a is beginning-of-period net wealth and s captures variables related to the labor mar-
ket over which the shopper has no control. In equilibrium, s follows a Markov chain with transition
matrix gt(s′|s). The labor income function is yt(s). The search model we develop determines both
g and y functions.
The shopper’s utility is separable, with CRRA period utility u(c) = u1−γ/(1−γ). There is a no-
borrowing constraint, which we take to be a realistic assumption to emerging market economies.
They then solve







s.t. c+ qta′ ≤ a+ yt(s),
a′ ≥ 0.
(3.1)
Value function J as defined in equation (3.1) consists on our main measure of welfare. The shopper
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takes as given the evolution of the state s in problem (3.1).
3.2.1 The Search Block - General Environment
The labor market in the economy contains DMP-style frictions that prevent firms willing to hire
and workers searching for jobs from immediately matching. Such frictions generate unemployment
in equilibrium. We allow workers to search on and off the job, an important assumption to avoid
having high-skill workers pass on low or minimum wage offers (in constrast to the data) for reasons
similar to the seminal McCall (1970) model. For simplicity, employed workers have no diminished
capacity of searching for jobs. The matching function has a standard Cobb-Douglas form:
M(U, F ) = µU εF 1−ε (3.2)
where U is the measure of searching workers and L is the measure of posted vacancies. Parameter
ε is of critical importance. The elasticity of job-finding rates to the market tightness (the ratio of
vacancies to searching workers in the market) is given by 1 − ε. In reducing or outright shutting
down informal activity, we reduce the firm’s value of having a posted vacancy (the choice of an
informal contract is no longer there!). As a consequence, fewer firms participate in the labor
market and so tightness declines. A higher elasticity (lower value of ε) then implies a sharper drop
in job-finding rates - a critical variable in the matter of income risk and unemployment.
Workers have different productivity levels h, a variable we refer to as skill type, or simply type.
These productivity levels are constant over time and the distribution of types over the population
is H . Employed workers receive labor income paid by the firm. Unemployed workers derive
a private utility of leisure (denominated in units of final good) ζ0 + ζ1h and an unemployment
income ς transferred by the government. The distinction between these two variables allows us
to govern the floor on paid wages while leaving the unemployment income - a critical variable! -
open in the calibration so we can match actual public transfer programs in Brazil.
Each firm in the model corresponds to a single vacancy and a single worker. When posting
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vacancies, we assume firms can direct their search towards workers of any given type h. Thus, each
skill type h effectively defines a segmented labor market in the model. The economic environments
of workers of different types therefore are not linked to each other. We follow standard notation
of the search literature: θt(h) is the market tightness in labor market h (that is, corresponding to
workers of skill type h) and pt(h) = M(θt(h)−1, 1) is the worker-finding rate for searching firms4.
The job-finding rate pt(h)θt(h) then follows - we often write pθt(h) instead to save space. The cost
of posting a vacancy κh is linear on productivity, as a way of preventing the model from artificially
generating a job-finding rate that is increasing on households’ types. Finally, we assume free-entry
of new firms in the market.
Each firm uses capital k and efficiency hours of labor ` to produce final goods according to a
Cobb-Douglas production function Akα`1−α. Let δ be the depreciation rate of capital and rt its
rental price in period t. Then, the choice of rented capital is static and solves max Akα`1−α −
(rt + δ)k. The first-order condition A(k/`)α−1 = rt + δ determines the capital-labor ratio k/` as a
function of rt. Let






− (r + δ)k
`
(r). (3.3)
Then, the net-of-capital-cost firm revenue is P (rt)` if the firm applies ` efficiency hours labor in
its production.
After paying for its vacancy, the entrant firm draws two individual state variables: e from a
time-t dependent distributionGe,t and z from a distributionGz. The support of the two distributions
are respectivelly E = [0, 1] and Z . The draws of e and z are independent, but we use the joint
distribution Gt = GzGe,t in the notation to save space. State z represents firm productivity. In
hiring a worker of skill type h, the firm has access to zh efficiency hours of labor until the match
ends. Like type h, productivity z is constant over time. As for the other state variable e, we refer
to it as a firm’s hiding ability. It captures unmodelled differences in the economic environment of
different business that lead to dissimilar capacities of avoiding legal, financial or social punishment
4Note that pt is not the vacancy-filling rate. Employed workers that find a new match can opt for staying in their










Figure 3.2: Timing of the Model
for establishing labor contracts outside legal standards. Small street stores on the countryside
may not face the same punishment from law enforcement or from public opinion as multinational
companies eager to keep positive images of their brand, or large retailers located on Times Square.
To keep the model tractable, we assume hiding costs in the form of reduced efficiency hours applied
by the firm. An informal firm with hiding ability e uses ezh efficiency hours of labor in production,
which justifies e ∈ [0, 1] almost surely. That specification makes the cost of informality be marginal
on productivity. A different specification would have it be a fixed cost. However, such specification
would lead informal firms to be, everything else the same (including hiding costs), more productive
than formal ones, a result at odds with firm-level evidence. Like states h and z, hiding costs e are
constant over time. After drawing its individual state (e, z), the firm can withdraw its vacancy and
wait for the next period to draw a new pair.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the timing of the model. The period begins and the labor market opens.
Firms that paid for a vacancy in the previous period draw a new state (e, z), start their search
and potentially match with a worker. We allow them to drop their vacancies if they draw an un-
favourable state. Bargaininig over the wage rate takes place for both new and continuing matches.
Then, production takes place, shoppers purchase final goods and bonds, and unmatched firms pay
the cost of keeping up their vacancies. New (unmatched) firms might enter the economy or con-
tinuing ones might exit. Before the period ends, separations between workers and firms occur
for exogenous reasons, and then the period ends. Note that shoppers make their decision without
knowing if their households’ workers keep their job.
The government taxes economic agents, make unconditional transfers to unemployed workers,
establishes a minimum wage and pays one-time unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to laid off
workers. To capture the relevant margins for Brazilian firms and workers, we assume four different
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forms of taxation, all charged at flat rates. Three of them are sales tax τy, payroll tax τw and worker
income tax τhh,t. The final tax is profit taxation, but to avoid unnecessary notation, we embed
profit taxation on the sales and payroll taxes. The minimum wage is ω, the same for all firms
and markets, and the UI benefit is a one-period transfer of υ final goods extended only to workers
that lose their job and fail to find a new job at the beginning of the following period (that is,
employed workers that transition to unemployment). Although having unemployment insurance
payments extend for multiple periods be a more realistic assumption, the one-period specification
offers more tractability at a small cost of realism5.
After learning their state (e, z) at the beginning of a period, firms decide in which labor market
to search and also whether to offer a formal or an informal labor contract. The formality status
of a contract can’t change thereafter. The government can’t enforce taxation or the minimum
wage on informal firms. Moreover, informal workers have no access to unemployment benefits in
case they lose their job, a realistic and relevant feature of the model. Regardless of previous job
formality status, all unemployed workers have access to the government’s unconditional transfer
ς . Not being subject to government norms and regulation reduces costs to the firm, but hiding its
activities also come at a cost for the firm, captured by their hiding ability state e. The decision
to offer a formal or informal contract takes place before the firm finds its match. Therefore, there
is no bargaining involved in the determination of the formality status of a contract: firms choose
the format that maximizes their value. Finally, matches end for exogenous reasons. In light of the
evidence of transitions of employment to unemployment (fact 1.1), we assume the separation rate
differs between formal (λf ) and informal (λi) jobs. In particular, informal workers lose their job
more often: λi > λf .
5With the one-period convention we calibrate υ to match the expected present discounted value of future flows of
benefits. In Brazil, unemployment benefits take the form of five monthly installments that cease as soon as the worker
finds a new occupation. Deviations between our model and reality occur as workers find jobs before the completion
of the five payment installments. Given the observed job-finding rate and the possibility of workers not reporting their
new jobs, we take the one-period approximation to be sufficiently accurate.
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3.2.2 Value Functions and Decision Sets
The value functions are V ft (z, h) (formal) and V it (ez, h) (informal) for firms with matched
worker of skill type h. For workers, the value functions areW ft (z, h) for employed formal workers,
W it (ez, h) for employed informal workers and W
n
t (h) for unemployed workers. Although each
firm has two individual states, z and e, we can state value functions with a single argument for
both since hiding ability affects efficiency hours in the same way productivity does. One can think
that firms effectively draw two levels of productivity, one corresponding to formality and the other
to informality, and then decide which one to carry6.
To write the expressions of the value functions, it is useful to establish additional notation.
Conditional on matching with a worker in the labor market in period t, let ρft (z, h) be the proba-
bility that this worker accepts the job and a new match is formed. Define ρit(ez, h) analogously.
Note that an unmatched firm decides to post a vacancy for a formal contract if ρft (z, h)V
f
t (z, h) ≥
max(0, ρit(z, h)V
i









If none of the two previous conditions hold, it drops its vacancy from the market7. So, define the
correspondences Zft (h) and Zit(h) that return the set of firms’ states that lead them to opt for a
formal and informal contract, respectivelly. We also define the set of states Z(h) that lead the
unmatched firm not to withdraw its vacancy.
Zft (h) =
{
(e, z) | ρft (z, h)V
f












t (h) ∪ Zit(h)
(3.4)
It is also useful to define the set of firm states that lead an employed worker to change jobs. For
example, a formal worker employed by a state z firm transitions to a new, formal job if he or she
finds a firm that opts for a formal contract vacancy and that carries an individual state that leads
6This is how we solve the model numerically. See section C.4 of the appendix for details.
7If indifferent, the new firm chooses a formal over an informal contract, and chooses not to post instead of posting
an informal contract. These choices are irrelevant for our solution, in any case.
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to a higher value to the worker. That is, the new state (e′, z′) must satisfy (e′, z′) ∈ Zft (h) and
W ft (z
′, h) > W ft (z, h). Applying this logic we define our correspondences8:
Φft (z, h) =
{
(e′, z′) ∈ Zft (h) |W
f
t (z











(e′, z′) ∈ Zft (h) |W
f
t (z








We are now ready to define our value functions. The free entry assumption ensures that the
value of unmatched firms equals zero. As for the value of matched firms, we start by stating
them as functions of wage rates w as well, V̂ ft (w, z, h) for example, and then given equilibrium
bargained wage rates wft (z, h) and wit(ez, h) we have V
f




t (z, h), z, h) (the same for
V it ).
V̂ ft (w, z, h) = (1− τy)P (rt)zh− (1 + τw)w + qt(1− λf )×
×
[









V̂ it (w, ez, h) = P (rt)ezh− w + qt(1− λi)×
×
[










A firm keeps its match to the following period if there is no separation shock (probability 1 − λ)
or if one of two conditions apply: 1. the worker fails to find a new offer or 2. the worker finds
a new offer, but prefers to stay in his or her current contract. The probability of either these
conditions apply accounts for the term in brackets in equations (3.6). When losing their employee
for any reason, the firm returns to the pool of unmatched firms and derives zero value. Another
observation of (3.6) is that it leaves it implied that wages are re-negotiated every period - otherwise
continuation values would also be functions of w.
8Expressions in (3.5) imply that workers only decide to switch jobs if they find a match that they strictly prefer to
their current one.
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The value of workers is more cumbersome to state, since we also need to care for the value
derived when the match ends. It is useful to first define the auxiliary function W st (W,ub, h) that
returns the value of searching (hence the superscript “s”) in the labor market with a reservation
value W and potential insurance benefit ub in case of no match:
W st (W,ub, h) = (1− pθt(h))(W + ub) + pθt(h)
∫
Zft (h)










The definition above leaves implied a condition we formalize in the next subsection: the value of
a formal or informal contract is independent from the prospective employee’s reservation value.
In the context of our model, this amounts to say that wages bargained by an employed and an
unemployed worker with a new firm are the same. Employed workers can’t convert their current
position into additional bargaining power. This is a simplifying assumption: it allows us to avoid
carrying three additional state variables (the two states of the previous employer and whether the
previous contract was formal or informal).
The value of a formal labor contract to the worker (again as a function of the wage rate w) is







t+1(h), υ, h) + (1− λf )W st+1(W
f




The dividend flow is simply the net-of-income-tax wage rate. The continuation value is discounted
by the price of the risk-free bond qt. One can argue that we should discount using preference
intertemporal discounting β, but results are not very affected by changing it, so we opt for the
literature standard. The first term in curly brackets captures the possibility the match ends. In that
case, the worker re-enters the labor market at the beginning of the following period. Not finding a
new match then means he or she transitions to unemployment and receives unemployment benefits
υ. The second term in curly brackets represents the chance the worker keeps his or her job and
enters the job market with the reservation value equal to the value of the current job. In this case,
72
no unemployment benefit is due in case the worker can’t find a new match, as he or she does not
transition to unemployment.
The value of an informal contract is






t+1(h), 0, h) + (1− λi)W st+1(W it+1(ez, h), 0, h)
}
. (3.8)
The worker can hide the wage payment from the government and thus pays no income tax. Also,
note that transition to unemployment does not lead to unemployment insurance benefits. Given an
equilibrium bargained wage functionwft (z;h) andwit(ez;h), we haveW
f




t (z, h), z, h)
and the same for W it .
Finally, the worker’s value at unemployment is:




t+1(h), 0, h). (3.9)
3.2.3 Wage Setting
We determine wage rates using Nash bargaining subject to minimum wages (in the case of
formal contracts). Start by defining Nash-bargained wages ŵ in the usual way:
ŵft (z, h) = argmax
w
(
Ŵ ft (w, z, h)−W nt (h)
) η
1−τhh,t V̂ ft (w, z, h)
1−η
1+τw
ŵit(ez, h) = argmax
w
(
Ŵ it (w, ez, h)−W nt (h)
)η
V̂ it (w, ez, h)
1−η
(3.10)
The first-order conditions for an interior solution to the optimization problems indicate a wage





W ft −W nt
V ft
=
W it −W nt
V it
. (3.11)
In case there is no wage rate w that guarantees both terms in parenthesis be non-negative, we set
ŵ to be the worker’s reservation wage and the firm then chooses not to offer the contract on such
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state. If we set ŵ to be the firm’s reservation wage, workers in turn would reject the contract.
The bargained wage ŵ coincides with the effective wage rate in the case of an informal contract:
wit(ez, h) = ŵ
i
t(ez, h). In the case of the formal contract, the minimum wage rate must be obliged,
so the effective wage is wft (z, h) = max(ω, ŵ
f
t (z, h)). For future reference:
wft (z, h) = max(ω, ŵ
f
t (z, h)),




This wage-setting mechanism deserves a few observations. First, the unemployed household is
always weakly (in practice, strictly) better off accepting a job than staying unemployed. Search-
ing workers without a job always transition to employment in case they find a match. Thus pθ
represents not only the job-finding rate but also the transition rate from unemployment to employ-
ment9. Second, using (3.10) and (3.12) to set wage rates for all instances of bargaining meets the
requirement needed for us to state value functions simply as (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8). The assumption
we make is that the outside option used in the bargaining process is always that of unemployment,
even if the worker is employed. We believe such simplification to be of little consequence to our
results for two reasons. First, in equilibrium it is probably the case that workers transition from less
productive to more productive matches. Allowing for the “correct” outside options would just lead
to higher wage rates in general, with little allocative effect that we can’t control by properly setting
bargaining power η. Second, and perhaps more importantly, given that wage rates are negotiated
on a period-by-period basis, the differentiated wages resulting from better outside options would
prevail for a single period only.
Another observation of the Nash bargaining procedure is that we adjust the bargaining power
in the case of a formal contract to reflect the incidence of taxation (meaning we divide η by 1− τhh
and 1 − η by 1 + τw), a necessary adjustment if we are to observe condition (3.11) holding. The
two equations in (3.11) imply that whenever the effective wage coincides with the interior solution
9Another assumption leading to this is that firms observe their type at the beginning of the period, before finding
a worker in the labor market.
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to the Nash problem ŵ, firms and workers agree on the preferred type of contract. In equilibrium,
we only fail to observe (3.11) when the minimum wage impedes the theoretical bargained wage to
prevail. In that case, firm and worker might disagree on their preferred contract only if the firm
offers an informal one10.
One final observation that we already commented on, and that relates to the previous two obser-
vations, is that we do not allow formal workers to use potential unemployment benefit payments
to bargain higher wages. There is no υ summing the outside option W n in the first equation in
(3.10). We choose not to include it for several reasons. First, as we just said, unemployment ben-
efits are only potential. Workers coming out of unemployment that fail to agree on a wage rate
with the firm have no access to the benefit, as they wouldn’t first transition to employment. Even
if we consider continuing formal employees, whether they would receive the benefit depends on
the assumption that the government pays insurance benefits to workers that become unemployed
for not being able to agree with the firm on a wage rate - an assumption we need not make as this
is an off-equilibrium outcome. A second reason for leaving out the unemployment benefit threat is
our empirical observation of Chapter 1 of the low income differential between formal and informal
workers (fact 1.2), a pattern that suggests a low or inexistent additional bargaining power owned
by formal workers. Another reason is that including υ as an ouside value would break condition
(3.11), and so new workers (as well continuing workers, depending on the off-equilibrium assump-
tion) could disagree with the formality choice made by the firm, a property of the model we do not
wish to break. Finally, including the benefit outside option to continuing workers but not to new
ones would again involve defining additional state variables to keep track of previous employment
positions, a complication we prefer to avoid.
10To see this claim, consider a firm drawing a state (e, z) that chooses to post a formal contract offer. We know
then that the firm anticipates (correctly, in equilibrium) V f (z, h) > V i(ez, h). If the minimum wage constraint binds,
the first equality in (3.11) fails to hold; instead, we have (W f − Wn)/V f > η/(1 − η) = (W i − Wn)/V i >
(W i −Wn)/V f . It follows that W f −Wn > W i −Wn. Firm and worker agree.
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3.2.4 Free Entry and Transition Rates
The condition of free entry determines the number of firms paying for vacancies each period.
At the beginning of each period, firms that paid for the vacancy in the previous period draw a pair
(e, z), decide if they keep their vacancy and, if they do, if they offer a formal or an informal labor
contract. Free entry implies that, for each labor market h, the expected value of drawing a new pair













dGt+1 = κh. (3.13)
Like most search models, condition (3.13) in practice determines the worker-finding rate pt(h)




Since employed workers search with full efficiency in the model, the market tightness coincides
with the number of searching firms in any labor market h (per worker of type h). Therefore,
tightness θt(h) and the number of firms that paid for a vacancy in the previous period Ft−1(h) are
linked through the following equation:
θt(h) = Gt(Zt(h))Ft−1(h). (3.15)
Lastly, to state ρft and ρit (the probabilities that a firm holds the worker conditional on a match),
we need to reference the distribution of workers in each labor market h. Given a skill level h,
let Ut(h) be the share of unemployed workers of type h that are unemployed. Let E
f
t ({e, z};h)
and Eit({e, z};h) be the measures of employed formal and informal workers normalized by the
measure of type h workers, H(h). Therefore Ut(h) + E
f
t (E × Z;h) + Eit(E × Z;h) = 1 for any
skill type. Let Ψfi,t(z, h) = {(e′, z′) : V it (e′z′, h) < V
f
t (z, h)} be the set of firm states such that




f,t(ez, h) and Ψ
i
i,t(ez, h) analogously. We have:
ρft (z) = Ut−1(h) + λfE
f
t−1(E × Z;h) + λiEit−1(E × Z;h)+
+ (1− λf )Eft−1(Ψ
f





ρit(z) = Ut−1(h) + λfE
f
t−1(E × Z;h) + λiEit−1(E × Z;h)+
+ (1− λf )Eft−1(Ψif,t(z, h);h) + (1− λi)Eit−1(Ψii,t(z, h);h)
(3.16)
Because employed workers suffer no loss of search efficiency, the normalized measure of searching
workers each period equals one, and so the expressions above require no denominator.
3.2.5 The Government
To add realism to the model, the government manages a public debt D. We use no time sub-
script because all our simulations assume fiscal neutral policies that allow the government to keep
the stock of public debt constant in all periods. Taxes represent the public source of revenue.
Expenditures comprise UI payments TRUI,t, unconditional transfers TRunc,t and public consump-













t (.;h)dH + qtD,
(3.17)
where UUI,t(h) is the share of type h workers that receive the one-time UI transfer. The left-hand
side groups expenses, the right-hand side groups sources of revenue.
In our simulations, we allow the government to set one of two variables only, public expenditure
Cgov,t or the income tax rate τhh,t. The government sets the other one so that public policy is
feasible (in the sense that the budget constraint (3.17) holds in all periods).
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3.2.6 The Representative Investor
The representative investor operates the technology that converts final goods into physical cap-
ital and vice-versa, and stores capital from one period to the next. He or she invests not only
in capital, but also holds the equity of existing firms and posts new vacancies in the market. To
finance these purchases, the investor issues one-period bonds to households. The representative
investor is a risk-neutral agent which, for simplicity, we allow to consume negative amounts.
Let DIVt be aggregate dividends and Qt the value of existing firms. The following proposition
captures the behavior of the representative investor and its consequences for equilibrium prices and
quantities.






holds, and the representative investor is indifferent between equity and capital investment. Period
t+ 1 consumption is then given by




and the investor’s balance sheet equality is
Kt+1 + qtQt+1 = Value of bonds sold to households.
We provide in section C.3 of the appendix the proof for proposition 3.1 and the details of the
representative investor’s problem.
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3.2.7 The Shopper’s State
Usually, descriptions of search models involve equations describing the evolution of the mea-
sure of workers in and out of jobs (in steady-state models, the equation simply says that the number
of workers transitioning to employment coincides with that of workers transitioning to unemploy-
ment). For our model, it is easier first to describe the shopper’s exogenous state s and calculate its
transition matrix g. Then, measures of employed and unemployed workers as well as the distribu-
tion between formal and informal contracts evolve according to g.
The shopper’s exogenous state is s = (d, e, z;h). State d represents labor market status:
whether the worker is employed and, if so, whether the contract is formal or informal. The pair
(e, z) represents the productivity and hiding ability of the employer. Of course, e is irrelevant if the
labor contract is formal, and both (e, z) are irrelevant if d indicates that the worker is unemployed.
Having the period income function y(s) be a function of current but not previous state requires
that we define an additional labor market status: unemployment insurance receiver. The income
function y then is
yt(s) =

(1− τhh,t)wf (z, h) if d = employed, formal
wit(ez, h) if d = employed, informal
ς if d = unemployed (no insurance)
ς + υ if d = unemployed (with insurance).
(3.19)
Having separation rates λf , λi and the transition-to-employment rate pt(h)θt(h), we can calcu-
late the probability of workers to transition to and from unemployment. Having firms’ value V ft
and V it , we can calculate their choices between formal and informal contracts each period. Having
the workers’ value W ft and W it , we can calculate the probability of workers to switch jobs. There-
fore, we have all we need to calculate the entire transition matrix g. The computation is tedious
and offers little additional intuition of the model, so we leave it to section C.2 of the appendix.
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Given the transition matrix g, the distribution of households across states (a, s), denoted xt(a, s),








where a′(a, s) solves problem (3.1). Of course, the distribution of workers of a given type over
different labor market status Eft , Eit and Ut follow from xt
11.
3.2.8 General Equilibrium
We are ready to define general equilibrium paths. The set of aggregate state variables of model
in period t include the distribution of households xt−1 (along with the corresponding distribution
of workers in the labor market Eft−1, E
i
t−1 and Ut−1), the measure of firms that paid for a vacancy
in the previous period Ft−1 and the stock of capital supplied by the investor Kt (a predetermined
variable).
Definition 1 (General Equilibrium) Given an initial aggregate state x0, F0 and K1, a feasible
public policy sequence {Cgov,t, τhh,t} and a path for the distribution of hiding abilities Ge,t, an
equilibrium consists on a path of: value functions for firms and workers V ft , V it , W
f
t , W it , W
n
t ;
wage rates wft , wit; market tightness θt; discount qt and interest rt rates; firm measures Ft; house-
hold measures xt; income processes yt; transition matrices gt; and consumption/savings policies
ct, a′t such that:
1. worker and firms’ value follow (3.6), (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9);
2. wage rates are determined by Nash bargaining (subject to the minimum wage in the case of
formal contracts);
11For example, Eft ({z};h) = xt(A , formal,E , {z}, h)H(h), where A is the set of possible net wealth positions.
80
3. the free entry condition (3.13) determines the number of searching firms Ft, and market
tightness follows from (3.15)
4. discount rates reflects capital rental cost (equation (3.18) holds);
5. the measure of households follows from g (equation (3.20));
6. the transition matrix and the income process follow from optimal worker and firm decisions;
7. consumption/savings policies solve the searcher’s problem (3.1) given yt and gt+1;
8. the capital market clears:
Kt+1 = qt
[∫
a′t(a, s)dxt −Qt+1 −D
]
. (3.21)
By Walras’ law, clearing of the capital market implies clearing in the final goods market:
Yt = Ct + Cgot,t + Invt + V Ct
where Yt is aggregate output and Invt = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt is investment in physical capital.
Definition 2 (Steady State) Given a feasible public policy pair {Cgov, τhh} and a distribution for
hiding abilities Ge, a steady state equilibrium is an equilibrium in the sense of definition 1 in
which the variables of the path do not depend on time, the initial conditions for the aggregate
state variables coincide with their constant path values and the public policy and hiding ability
distribution sequences are defined by {Cgov, τhh} and {Ge} for all periods.
The model does not include aggregate uncertainty. In our simulations, we start with a baseline
steady state equilibrium. It provides the initial values for the aggregate state required by definition
1. The economy then faces an "MIT" shock: sudden, unanticipated changes in the paths of the
hiding ability distribution Ge,t (which captures the repression of informal labor) and public pol-
icy (either government consumption or the income tax). We calculate the equilibrium associated
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with these new paths. Our baseline steady state, which we describe in the following section, also
provides benchmarks for prices, aggregates and welfare.
3.3 Calibration
We calibrate parameters with a mix of standard choices in the Labor and Macroeconomics
literature, parameters disciplined by the Brazilian labor, tax and social security law as of 2018,
and of course parameters chosen to have the model match specific targets observed in the data, in
particular those associated with facts 1.1 through 1.3. To facilitate comparison, we assume one
model period corresponds to one quarter. Our main goal is to replicate the patterns of income
and informality we find in our analysis of Brazilian data in section 1, while sticking to reasonable
values for the parameters. The scale of the model is 1 unit of model good = 10,000 Brazilian reals
(or US$ 2,500 using our conversion rate). Table 3.1 presents our baseline calibration.
Starting with preference parameters, we choose a coefficient of relative risk-aversion equal to
3, a standard value in the Macroeconomics literature. To calibrate the intertemporal discounting β,
we start by taking from the Brazilian Central Bank website data on corporate credit interest (ICC
- Credit Cost Indicator). After discounting for annual CPI inflation and averaging on the Jan-2012
to Dec-2019 period, we find a 16.1% average real interest rate. We calibrate β so that the model
generates a slightly lower value of 15% annualized interest rate (discount q ≈ 0.96566). This is
a large value for the average yield of household investment. We stick to it as our main concert is
the correct discounting of future streams of profits by firms. Such discounting is critical for their
formalization choice.
Moving to technology parameters, we set A so that P (r) = 1. The share of capital income α
is set at 0.33. The rate of capital depreciation we set so that, on the aggregate, capital investment
is ten percent of aggregate output. Added to investment in vacancy costs, total investment equals
16.8% of output, close to Brazilian average since 1996.
Parameters related to public policy are entirely calibrated based on Brazilian law and actual
82
Symbol Interpretation Source/Target Value
Preferences
β Intertemporal discounting r = 15% per year 0.95458
γ Relative risk aversion Literature standard 3
Technology
A Model scale P (r) = 1 0.7062
α Capital income share Literature standard 0.33
δ Rate of capital depreciation δK/Y = 0.1 0.01546
Labor Market
λf Separation rate (formal) Transition unemployment 0.04
λi Separation rate (informal) Transition unemployment 0.098
κ Vacancy cost Market tightness = 1 0.064
µ Matching function constant Unemployment rate = 16% 0.255
1− ε Job-finding rate elasticity Literature average 0.375
η Worker’s “bargaining power” Hosios condition 0.625
ζ0 Leisure Income differential (low inc.) 0.02
ζ1 Leisure Income differential (low inc.) 0.16
Public Policy
τy Sales tax rate Tax law 0.272
τw Payroll tax rate Tax and labor law 0.1648
τhh Household income tax rate Tax law 0.09
ω Minimum wage Labor law 0.0998
ς Unemployment income Bolsa Família program 0.01
υ Unemployment insurance Social security 0.1833
D Public debt Debt-to-GDP = 42% 0.6583
Distributions
ξ Skill distribution parameter Formal income histogram 0.61
σz Productivity dispersion Income variance and differential 100%
φ Probability of e = 0 Informality share 0.75
ν Hiding ability distribution Income differential (high inc.) 9
Table 3.1: Baseline Calibration
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policy. The statutory tax rate on profits is 9%. To ease notation, we did not define a profit tax.
Instead, we adjust the sales and payroll tax rates accordingly. The payroll tax rate τw = (1.28) ×
(0.91)− 1 = 0.1648 corresponds to the sum of the mandatory employer contributions to the social
security (20%) and to the worker’s severance fund (8%)12. The sales tax is harder to calibrate
due to the myriad of different forms of taxation established by the federal and local governments.
In a calibration of the Brazilian economy, Ulyssea (2018) uses a rate of 29.25%, calculated by
the combination of taxes over manufactured products (IPI) and additional contributions to social
security charged on revenue (PIS/COFINS). We opt for a lower rate (20%) as the model can’t
capture firms’ ability to pass taxes over to consumers. After correcting for profit taxation, however,
we end up with a figure similar to Ulyssea, τy = 1 − (0.8) × (0.91) = 0.272. The income tax
rate τhh = 0.09 is based on the worker’s (also mandatory) contribution to the social security
system. This choice of τhh assumes no personal income taxation, a choice we make based on the
observation that most workers locate in the first bracket of the progressive income taxation scheme,
so they pay no income taxes. The minimum wage ω = 249.5/2, 500 = 0.0998 follows the labor
law. We calibrate unemployment income ς to be BR$ 100 = US$ 25. This target is motivated
by the Bolsa Familia program, a basic income program that provides financial assistance to poor
households in Brazil. The value of the monthly transfer for standard participation in the program
was 85 Brazilian reals in 2018 and the average benefit per household (not individual) was 187 reals,
so we take our calibration to be conservative in the sense that it is more generous to households than
the actual program. Finally, public UI benefits in Brazil depend on the worker’s income in his or
her previous job. We opt for a constant value because the lower and upper limits on the value of the
benefits are close to each other. The lower limit is set at the minimum wage BR$ 998 = US$ 249.5
per month and the upper limit in 2018 was BR$ 1,677 = US$ 419. Given the higher concentration
of workers in the lower end of the income distribution we assume a benefit of BR$ 1,100 = US$
275. Workers receive five monthly installments, so we set υ = (5/3)× 275/2, 500 = 0.1833.
12The law requires employers to contribute towards a severance fund (FGTS), with monthly payments set at 8% of
worker’s wage rate. It is financed by taxes charged on the firms’ payroll as well. Workers can’t withdraw money from
their account except when losing their job without “just cause”, retiring and a few other specific contingencies.
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Moving on to labor market parameters, we choose rates of exogenous separation λf and λi
to target observed transition rates from formal and informal employment to unemployment, as
shown in Chapter 1. We target pre-recession rates, 3% for formal jobs and 7.5% for informal
ones. The vacancy cost parameter κ and the matching function constant µ target respectivelly an
average market tightness of one and an average unemployment rate of 16%. We calculate these




U(h)dH . Note that the average market tightness
across types h is also the unconditional market tightness (total firms searching divided by total
workers searching), since all workers search in the market every period. The exponent in the
matching function ε governs the elasticity of the job-finding rate to market tightness. As we lack
the empirical evidence of the number of vacancies in Brazil, we can’t disciple our choice by the
data. Instead, we take a median point of the literature and set ε = 0.625 (Shimer (2005) sets
ε = 0.72, Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) set ε = 0.5). We set the worker’s “bargaining power”
η to satistfy the Hosios (1990) efficiency condition. The two parameters governing the worker’s
private value of leisure ζ0 and ζ1 we set to calibrate the level and slope of income differential
among low-income workers (this is similar to targetting the average wage rates among informal
workers).
We now turn to the parameterization of the distributions of the model, H , Gz and Ge. We
discretize skill levels with ten equally-spaced values h = h1 < h2 < · · · < h10 = h̄, with a
distribution H such that H(ht+1) = ξH(ht). We choose a value of ξ to target the share of formal
workers receiving a labor income in the US$200-US$400 income range. Bounds h = 0.03 and
h̄ = 0.185 are so that the ten worker groups cover the range of average income observed among
different occupational groups and educational levels (between US$250 and US$900, monthly). As
for productivity draws, we assume Gz ∼ LogNormal(−σ2z/2, σ2z). We set σz = 100%, a value that
generates enough variance in the log income of various worker groups and that keep the income
differential away from the minimum wage low, as we saw to be the case in the data.
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3.3.1 Hiding Ability and Government Surveillance
Given that we lack a structural model of government surveillance of informal contracts, we
capture the repression of informality by changes in the distribution of hiding abilities. The tight-
ening of enforcement leads to lower probabilities that firms draw high values of hiding ability. In
particular, the distribution Ge,t is such that draws of e are determined by the following mixture:
e = (1− DummySurveillance,t)× Beta[ν, 1].
DummySurveillance,t captures the probability that a firm draws e = 0, which increases as the gov-
ernment tightens its control over labor contracts. It can only take two values:
DummySurveillance,t =

1 with probability φt
0 with probability 1− φt.
Parameter φt captures the measure of firms/jobs that face conditions that make it unfeasible under
any circumnstances to hire informally. This would be the case if they were audited by the govern-
ment. Thus, our simulation of the repression of informal activity consists on increases of φt over
time.
The other term of the mixture is a Beta distribution, a natural choice given that its support is
the [0, 1] inverval, as required by the model. Shape parameter ν governs the extent to which the
distribution concentrates mass close to the upper bound 1. Thus, higher values of ν indicate lower
average hiding costs and greater capacity of firms to hire informally. There is a tension in the
calibration of ν and φ as both parameters have a significant impact on the size of the informal
sector. In the baseline calibration, we set ν = 9 to target the low income differential among
high income workers. This implies that the Beta distribution has an average of 90%. That choice




The numerical procedure we use to approximate the equilibria we study is, in general, standard
in the Macroeconomics literature. We defer details to section C.4 of the appendix. We discretize
the distribution of (e, z) with 50 productivity values, 49 positive ones calculated using Tauchen’s
method (which also discretizes Gz), and zero. To account for the Ge distribution, we adjust the
probability of each productivity draw, in that each new firm effectively draws a pair (z, ez) in the
discretized grid. See the appendix for the details. For each skill level h, the space of exogenous
states s therefore contains 102 states: fifty points of formal employment, fifty of informal em-
ployment, unemployment and unemployment with UI benefits. We discretize the asset grid with a
fifty-point grid, and evaluate asset levels out of the grid using linear interpolation. We compute the
solution to the shopper’s problem (3.1) using the endogenous grid method (Carroll, 2006).
3.3.3 Baseline Equilibria and Model Performance
Before proceding to our simulations, we explore the model’s mechanics as well as its per-
formance in reproducing the three facts of section 1. Figure 3.3 plots the main functions of the
search equilibrium: firms’ value V in panel 3.3a, workers’ value W in panel 3.3b and (net) wage
rates (1 − τhh)wf , wi in panel 3.3c. We also depict in panel 3.3d the choice of searching firms of
whether and which type of contract to post in the labor market. Taking panel 3.3a, the solid curve
corresponds to the formal firm V f (z, h); the thick dashed curve corresponds to the informal firm
V i(ez, h) with hiding ability e = 1; the other three thin dashed curves correspond to lower levels
of hiding ability, e = 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, from the top to the bottom. The interpretation of the solid and
dashed curves is similar for the other two function plots. All curves plot the functions evaluated
at h, which is the lowest skill level in the calibration. The same is true for the production regions.
There is nothing special about this choice of skill level for the plots - we choose it to make figures
prettier.
In the case of panel 3.3a, the x-axis crosses the y-axis at zero. Entrant firms that draw a state
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(d) Regions of Production
Notes: Panel (a). Firm value functions V f (z, h) (solid) and V i(ez, h) (dashed) for h, the lowest skill type. The thick dashed curve corresponds
to e = 1. The remaining three dashed curves correspond, respectively, to e = 0.75, e = 0.50 and e = 0.25 from the top to the bottom. Panel (b).
Worker value functions W f (z, h) (solid) and V i(ez, h) (dashed) for h, the lowest skill type. Dashed curves have the same interpretation as panel
(a). Panel (c). Net-of-tax income functions (1 − τhh)wf (z, h) (solid) and wf (z, h) (dashed) for h. Dashed line indicates net-of-tax minimum
wage. In all panels, x-axis indicates firm productivity z. Panel (d). We divide the firm’s state space into three regions according to the decision of
an unmatched firm of whether and which type of contract to post in the labor market.
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium Functions - Lowest Skill Type
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associated with a negative match value immediatly leave the market, and so we have no interest on
the shape of the value function in those states. In the case of panel 3.3b, with the value of workers,
the lower bound on the employment value of any worker corresponds to the unemployment value
W n (not plotted). The kink in the formal value of both firms and workers (the solid curves)
marks the productivity level below which the minimum wage constraint binds (approximately 6.5
in this case). The constraint does not apply for informal contracts. Still focusing on the panels
with value functions, notice their slight convexity on z. It is explained by on-the-job search: as
productivity increases, not only does the discounted sum of dividends (linearly) increases, but also
the probability that the worker leaves the job by finding a better one declines (sets Φf and Φi
shrink), which leads to greater continuation value to the firm. Nash bargaining then distributes the
value gain to the worker via larger bargained wages, which justifies the convexity of the worker’s
value as well.
Comparing panels 3.3a and 3.3b, we note a feature of the model we emphasized in subsection
3.2.3. Whenever the minimum wage is not binding, worker and firm agree on the preferred type
of contract (equilibrium condition (3.11)). When the minimum wage does bind, it tends to be the
case that workers prefer formal contracts, but the set of productivity states that are high enough
to justify formal firm activity is somewhat reduced. Note, in addition, that the slope of the formal
firm’s value (and hence of the formal worker’s value too) is greater than that of the informal firm
even with e = 1. Therefore, if we make the productivity grid sufficiently large, then for each value
of hiding ability e, there would be a productivity level z∗(e) such that the unmatched firm opts
for a formal contract whenever it draws z greater or equal to z∗(e). The wage function in panel
3.3c suggests this is a key mechanism of the model. Given a productivity z, it is not the case that
formal firms always pay higher wages. The answer to that question depends on the hiding ability
of the informal firm against which we compare the salary received in the formal sector. Indeed,
assuming the minimum wage contraint doesn’t bind, informal workers hired by firms with perfect
hiding ability (e = 1) tend to receive wages significantly higher than their formal counterparts
hired by firms with similar productivity. Therefore, the inverse relationship between income and
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informality share, as stated by fact 1.1 of section 1, is a byproduct not of higher wages in the
formal sector per se, but of the different productivity compositions of each sector: the greater slope
of formal firm’s value means that the formal sector concentrates firms and workers with superior
productivity, on average.
In fact, we can see this more clearly by looking at the decision of searching firms as shown by
panel 3.3d. The x-axis contains different firm productivity levels z and the y-axis contains hiding
ability levels e. There are three regions in figure: A (yellow region), B (red) and C (blue). An
unmatched firm that at the beginning of a period draws a pair (e, z) in region A drops its vacancy
from the market, as the value of formal and informal workers is negative. Pairs in region B lead
the firm to offer an informal contract and pairs in region C lead the firm to offer a formal contract.
We also draw with a dashed line the lowest firm productivity compatible with a formal contract
zf (that is, z such that V f (zf , h) = 0). Such level of productivity is of particular interest to us,
for two reasons. First, it reconciliates our model with two classic visions of informality present
in the literature: the "parasite" view and the "survival" view. We can call informal firms with
productivity levels superior to zf (region B, to the right of the dashed line) parasites in the sense
that their economic activity would be viable in the formal sector. They opt for an informal contract
only for profit maximization reasons. On the other hand, informal firms with productivity levels
lower than zf (region B, to the left of the dashed line) also choose an informal contract for profit
maximization, but in their case hiring the worker formally would not be economically viable. In
that sense, their survival as firms (or jobs) depends on the possibility of operating informally.
Second, and more importantly, these two "types" of informal firms lead to conflicting forces in
the simulation of the repression of informality. Ignoring other general equilibrium effects, without
the option of the informal agreement, "parasite firms" (to the right of zf ) simply migrate to the
formal sector, which leads to a decrease in the average productivity of searching firms and no
change in the number of firms searching in the labor market. "Survival firms", on the contrary, exit
the market, as they can’t survive by offering formal contracts. Such exit leads to an increase in
the average productivity of searching firms (by definition, their productivity is always lower than
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that of formal firms) and a decline in the total number of firms searching in the market. In our
simulations the latter force dominates the former.
Figure 3.4 presents four panels with figures that illustrate the model’s performance in the di-
mensions we care about the most. We already presented all these plots in Chapter 1, but now we
also show the predictions of the model. Panels 3.4a, 3.4c and 3.4d show, respectively, the infor-
mality share, the income differential among workers earning less than US$ 300 and the income
differential among workers earning more than that. In each of the plots, the filled circles corre-
spond to occupational groups (as defined in Chapter 1) in the data, the unfilled circles correspond
to educational levels and the squares linked by the black curve correspond to the skill types in the
model. Again, the x-axis shows our proxy for group productivity, the average income of the corre-
sponding group (not conditional on excluding workers above and below the threshold). In the case
of panels 3.4c and 3.4d, the lack of smoothness in the model curves follows from the discretization
process. Setting an income threshold to calculate a statistic leaves results rather sensitive to the
position of the productivity points in the grid. Panel 3.4b shows the histogram of income. Like
we do in Chapter 1, we group workers in US$200 income bins and plot the histogram in the data
(black curves) and in the model (red/lighter curves). The solid curves indicate the income of formal
workers, the dashed curves indicate that of informal ones.
The model succedes in replicating the patterns of the data the figures convey, in particular facts
1.1 and 1.2. The share of informal workers declines as we move from low to high skill types, but
remains economically significant. As worker skill increases, the probability of productivity draws
(by new firms) leading to binding minimum wage decreases and, with it, so does the probability
that the firm chooses to post informal contract vacancies to avoid it. In addition, the difference
in the slopes of the formal and informal firm value functions - as we verify in plot 3.3a - also
implies that firms opt for a formal contract more often as h increases. Thus, the existence of a
minimum wage is not the only driver of informality shares decreasing in average income. In terms
of income distribution, we also take that the model does a fine job in replicating the empirical
evidence, especially taking into consideration that we devote a single parameter to target it (ξ, the
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(c) Income differential (below US$ 300)
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(d) Income differential (above US$ 300)
Notes: Panel (a). Informality share in the data (filled and unfilled circles) and the model (linked squares circles). Each square circle corresponds
to a different skill level h. The x-axis indicates our proxy for group productivity, the average income of each group among all workers. Panel (b).
Income histogram in the data (balck curves) and in the model (lighter curves). Each income bin has a size of US$200 (per month). Panels (c) and
(d). The plots show the income differential: the difference of the average income among formal and informal workers, expressed as a percentage of
the average income among informal ones. Panel (c) considers only workers receiving less than US$300 income. Panel (d) considers only workers
receiving more than US$300. In both plots, the x-axis continues to indicate the unconditional average of each group as a proxy for productivity.
Figure 3.4: Informality and Income - Data and Baseline Calibration
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skill distribution parameter). As expected, we observe no formal worker earning labor income
below US$ 200 per month - a consequence of the minimum wage constraint. One caveat is that,
in the data, more informal workers locate in the second income bin (US$ 200 - US$ 400) then
in our model. One potential explanation is the existence of informal firms that choose to respect
the minimum wage law, a force we don’t capture with our analytical framework. The minimum
wage assumption also plays a key role in generating realistic income differential patterns. Panels
3.4c and 3.4d show that the model successfully generates the large differential among low-income
workers and the reduced differential among high-income workers. In shutting down the minimum
wage (set ω = 0), the differential below the threshold immediately retreats to levels near zero, for
all skill types. As for the low income differential above the threshold, the key feature of the model
to generate it is the heterogeneity in hiding abilities e, which allows the calibration to generate
productive informal firms paying high wages, while keeping the size of the informal sector as a
whole in check.
Finally, table 3.2 reports some additional targeted and non-targeted moments. The calibration is
successful in having the model replicate the targeted moments, in particular the patterns related to
transitions to unemployment. As we see in 1.3 of Chapter 1, it is the case that in the model informal
workers transition more often to unemployment, a mere consequence of our choice of calibration
of λf and λi. As for the untargeted moments, direct transitions between formal and informal
employment appear to be underrepresented in the model, probably a consequence of the fact that
we don’t allow firms and workers to re-negotiate the formality status of the labor contract. Given
the relatively low frequency with which we observe such transitions in the data, we do not take this
failure to be too problematic. As for the variance of income (calculated in logs, and conditional
on the occupational group in the data or the skill type in the model), we observe in the data large
as well as small values of such variance over the different survey waves and occupational groups.
Values vary between 0.22 and 1.96. In our calibration, increasing the dispersion σz of productivity
draws generates additional volatility, but hinders our ability to keep income differentials among




Unemployment rate 0.16 0.160
Market tightness 1 1.003
Informality share 0.3 0.326
Transition formal-unemployment 0.03 0.030
Transition informal-unemployment 0.075 0.075
Non-Targeted
Transition unemployment-employment 0.2 - 0.3 0.233
Transition formal-informal 0.045 0.014
Transition informal-formal 0.18 0.057
Variance of log income 0.2 - 2.0 0.242
Table 3.2: Targeted and Non-targeted Moments
range observed in the data between 2012 and 2020.
3.4 The Repression of Informality: A Simulation
We simulate the repression of informal labor activity by changing the distribution of hiding
abilities. In period zero, the economy is in the baseline steady state as calibrated in the previous
section. In particular, φ0 = 0.75 (searching firms draw e = 0 with a probability of 75%). From
period one onward, we set φt = 1, t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . Therefore, starting in period one, all unmatched
firms draw e = 0 with probability one. Obviously, these firms no longer opt to offer informal con-
tracts, as they result in no efficiency hours employed in production and thus no revenue. Instead,
they decide between posting a vacancy for a formal job or leaving the market without posting a
vacancy and waiting for the next period. Formally, we calculate an equilibrium path in the sense
of definition 1 in which the initial values of the aggregate state variables are those from our base-
line steady state. Calculation of the path also requires us to take a stance on public policy. In our
baseline simulation, we fix public expenditure Cgov at its baseline value and change the income tax
rate τhh,t so that the budget constraint (3.17) holds every period. This makes the policy change to
be fiscally neutral. In section 3.5 we examine the opposite case. We simulate the transition path
for four hundred quarters (in addition to period zero), or one hundred years. We also experiment
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with five hundred quarters and find similar results.
The intent of the exercise is to simulation the repression of informality in the sense of the word.
The means by which the government pursues such a policy in reality are irrelevant as long as: (1)
the actions are strong enough to enforce formalization of labor relations throughout the economy;
(2) the policy does not involve changes in the economic margins related to formal contracts (this
involves unaltered taxes for firms and households, and unaltered unemployment benefits13); and
(3) the economic possibilities of workers during unemployment that are not related to securing a
new job also remain the same. Condition (2) does not say that taxes have to be constant, only
that the specific policy adopted by the government to repress informality does not rely on such
taxes. We do consider changes to taxation that follow from general equilibrium effects and fiscal
neutrality. Condition (3) above rules out changes to unemployment income ς , which we calibrate
to replicate Brazilian social security transfer programs.
3.4.1 Aggregates and the Income Process
We first focus on the effects of the repression of informality on macroeconomic variables, prices
and the income process. In the next subsection we discuss welfare effects. Table 3.3 summarizes
the transition with some of the main endogenous variables and statistics. The first column indicates
the variable (the symbol "%∆" means that the variable is represented as percentage deviation from
its baseline steady state value). The other columns correspond each to one point in time during the
transition.
It proves useful to first focus on long run effects (last column of table 3.3). Removing informal-
ity from the labor market entails significant changes to the economic environment of the model.
We see that φ = 1, as expected, is sufficient to drive informal activity out of the labor market.
All employed workers have a formal contract in the new steady state. Note that, while interest
rates are roughly unchanged, the income tax rate changes significantly (from 9% to -19.3%). Since
13In the simulation we do alter income taxation, but as a response to the endogenous changes provoked by a
separate policy - movements in φ - that, in itself, do not rely on income taxation.
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Variables Baseline One year Ten years Forty years Long run
t = 0 t = 4 t = 40 t = 80 t =∞
Interest rate (%) 15 16.8 17.9 16 15
Income tax rate (%) 9 0.2 -12.5 -16.8 -19.3
Informality share (%) 32.9 13 0 0 0
Unemployment rate (%) 16 18.5 16.8 15.9 15.5
Market tightness (%) 100.1 55.3 51 59 62.7
Job-finding rate (%) 23.4 17.2 16.2 17.1 17.5
Transition unemployment (%) 4.5 4.0 3.3 3.2 3.2
Firm revenue - avg (%∆) 0 6 17.5 21.7 24.7
Firm revenue - entry (%∆) 0 56.7 53.7 54.5 57.7
Labor income - avg (%∆) 0 12.2 34.5 43.5 49.3
Labor income - entry (%∆) 0 51.5 65 71.5 76.9
Aggregates
Output (%∆) 0 6.3 23.2 29.1 32.9
Capital (%∆) 0 -1.3 9.7 23.9 32.9
Efficiency Hours (%∆) 0 10.7 30.8 32 33.2
Savings (%∆) 0 -1.5 11.6 22.6 29.6
Sales tax revenue (%∆) 0 17.9 46.3 53.2 57.8
Income tax revenue ($) 24 0.5 -47.1 -66.1 -77.6
Notes: The table shows the value of some endogenous variables and statistics in the transition path. In t = 0, the economy is in the baseline
steady state. In t = 1, the government starts the repression of informality: the value of φt changes to 1, where it stays for good. Throughout
the transition, the government adjusts the income tax rate τhh,t so that its budget constraint (3.17) holds with the baseline equilibrium value of
government consumption Cgov . The symbol "%∆" means that the variable is represented as percentage deviation from its baseline steady state
value.
Table 3.3: Simulation of Informality Repression
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government’s revenues come mostly from sales taxation14, the required change in income taxation
is significant. The unemployment rate in the new steady state falls slightly to 15.5% from 16%
in the baseline equilibrium. This is the end result of two opposing forces: a significant decline
in the rate workers transition to unemployment (from 4.5 to 3.2%) and an also significant decline
in job-finding rates (= transition to employment rates), from 23.4% to 17.5%. Workers transi-
tion to unemployment more rarely as a direct consequence of our assumption that the separation
rate of formal jobs is smaller than that of informal jobs. The end of informality thus implies that
matches have a higher duration, on average. At the same time, finding a job becomes a less fre-
quent event as well, as the relative number of firms posting vacancies is smaller (lower market
tightness). Contrary to standard search models, we allow workers to search in the labor market
every period, employed or not, with full efficiency. Therefore, the measure of searching workers in
the model is the same in any equilibrium, and changes to job-finding rates are entirely accounted
for by fluctuations in the measure of new firms.
We can also see from table 3.3 the effects on firm productivity and wages. The repression of
informal work causes an increase in the average firm productivity (a similar prediction to Meghir
et al. (2015)). We can see this by the 25% increase in average firm revenue. The average produc-
tivity of firms employing workers coming out of unemployment (which we indicate by "entry")
increases by 58%. Panel 3.5a of figure 3.5 depicts the gain in average productivity. We build $200
bins of firm gross revenue and show how the number of jobs in each bin varies from steady state
to steady state. The negative values for low revenue bins reveal that unproductive firms leave the
economy. For the most part, these are the informal firms we referred to as "survival firms" in sec-
tion 3.3, that depend on the possibility of avoiding regulation (taxes and especially the minimum
wage) to operate. As they no longer participate in the economy, congestion in the labor market
reduces and, although finding a job becomes harder, workers improve their chance of finding a
better one in case they do. These productivity gains, paired with lower income taxes, translate into
14We do not regard this as a problematic result of the model. In comparison to other countries, the Brazilian system
imposes large taxes on goods and services, and lower taxes on income. Besides, we ignore in the model the progressive
nature of income taxation, which thus causes understatement of income tax proceeds.
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higher labor income for workers, as paid wages are increasing in firm productivity (figure 3.3c).
As expected, gains are again more pronounced for workers coming out of unemployment: 77%
against the overall 49% increase.
Finally, we analyze how aggregates react. As households are working more time (the unem-
ployment rate drops) and on more productive jobs, total efficiency hours of labor employed in
production increases and, with it, the demand for physical capital by firms. The relatively sta-
ble interest rate indicates that such increased demand is met by additional aggregate savings as
well. With more efficiency hours of labor and capital employed, total output increases by about
33%. Sales tax revenue increase by 58%, since firms no longer have the option of avoiding taxes
and their average revenue improves. The additional tax proceeds allows the government to reduce
the income tax rate into negative territory. The aggregate deficit of $77.6 per month with income
tranfers coincides with the average transfer, given that the economy features a unity measure of
households.
We calculate the numbers presented in table 3.3 by looking at the whole population. But how do
the effects change between workers of different skill types? Panels 3.5b and 3.5c of figure 3.5 help
with this question. For each skill level h, panel 3.5c plots the change in job-finding rates among
the corresponding group of workers and 3.5b plots the percentage change in average labor income
(light bars) and average formal labor income (darker bars). For both plots, the x-axis contain the
average income of each skill group in the baseline steady state as a proxy of group productivity.
Panel 3.5c shows that job-finding rates decline more in the case of low-skill workers. The un-
derlying reason is the existence of a minimum wage, which price low-skill workers out of formality
more often then high-skill ones. Thus, as informal contracts cease from being an option to the firm,
the set of productivity states that justify the creation of a job vacancy becomes smaller, and such ef-
fect is magnified in job markets with low-skill workers. As for panel 3.5b, it indicates a significant
increase in average labor income for workers of all skill levels. As commented previously, this is
to a large extent a consequence of the change in the income tax rate and gains in firm productivity
shown in panel 3.5a. Looking first at the increases in average labor income among formal workers,
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Notes: All panels refer to the long-run effects of the repression of informality. Panel (a). We show the change in the number of firms that locate in
each $250 gross revenue bin. The x-axis corresponds to the lower bound on the revenue bin. Negative values mean that there are less firms with
gross revenue in range corresponding to the bin. Panel (b). Percentage change in average labor income for workers of each skill type h. The x-axis
shows the average income of workers with the corresponding type in the baseline steady state. Light bars correspond to overall labor income; dark
bars correspond only to formal labor income. Panel (c). Change in the job-finding rate for workers of each skill type h. The x-axis has the same
interpretation as panel (b).
Figure 3.5: Long-Run Effects of the Repression of Informality
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we see that they are not very different across skill types. They fall between 26% and 37%. Note
that the impact of changes in firm productivity on formal income is not straightforward. Recall
from figure 3.3d that the static impact of the inclusion of "parasite" informal firms into formality
is a decline of average productivity among unmatched firms. In fact, it is indeed the case that,
on average, unemployed workers match with less productive formal firms in the equilibrium with-
out informality. As for gains in average labor income overall (as opposed to only that of formal
workers), they are much less homogeneous, ranging between 29% and 64%. Low skill workers
observe the largest gains. Given fact 1.2 of Chapter 1 – which our model replicates – this is not
very surprising. Groups of low skill workers concentrate more low-income earners, to which the
minimum wage binds more often. As informal jobs vanish, employment opportunities - however
rare - always entail payment of the legal floor, which lifts the average labor income.
Having seen what the long run looks like, we now pay attention to what transition dynamics
look like. Table 3.3 again provides a picture of these dynamics, but figures 3.6 and 3.7 facilitate
visualization. They show the paths of some of the main endogenous variables. The horizontal axis
always shows time t. For many of the variables, specifically those with caption that reads "%∆",
we show the percentage difference between their value in period t and their baseline value in period
zero. For example, panel 3.6c plots Kt/K0 − 1. We choose the order of the plots to facilitate our
exposition.
Focusing first on figure 3.6, we have in panel 3.6a the path of aggregate efficiency hours of
labor used in production. Starting from the first period of the transition, it increases until it sta-
bilizes at its long-run level, 33% higher than the initial equilibrium. The intuition is the same as
before: average firm productivity increases as the end of informality drives unproductive jobs out
of the market. In fact, we can also see this by noting that, for the first fifteen years of the transi-
tion, the unemployment rate is higher than in the baseline equilibrium (panel 3.7b of figure 3.7),
which means that the total number of hours of labor declines. Aggregate efficiency hours can only
increase if the average efficiency hours of each job increases. As before, gains in firm productivity
and lower income taxes lead to higher average after-tax income, panel 3.6b.
100






(a) %∆ Efficiency Hours of Labor








(b) %∆ Avg. After-Tax Income






(c) %∆ Stock of Capital








(d) %∆ Aggregate Savings














(f) %∆ Aggregate Output
Notes: The figures show the equilibrium paths of different variables in the model. With the exception of panel 3.6e, the curves draw percentage
difference between the value of each variable in time t and their baseline value. For example, panel 3.6c plots Kt/K0 − 1. The economy starts
at the baseline steady state in period 0. In period one, φ (the probability that unmatched firms have of drawing zero hiding ability) unexpectedly
changes from 0.75 to 1, where it stays thereafter. The transition takes 400 periods to reach the new steady state. Panel 3.6b shows the average after
tax and transfers income. It includes unemployed workers. Panel 3.6e plots annualized interest rates.
Figure 3.6: Repression of Informality - Transition Dynamics
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(d) Income Tax Rate







(e) %∆ Government Consumption
Notes: The figures show the equilibrium paths of different variables in the model. The economy starts at the baseline steady state in period 0.
In period one, φ (the probability that unmatched firms have of drawing zero hiding ability) unexpectedly changes from 0.75 to 1, where it stays
thereafter. The transition takes 400 periods to reach the new steady state.
Figure 3.7: Repression of Informality - Transition Dynamics
102
As we argue to be the case in the long-run equilibrium, the increase in efficiency hours used
in production drives up the capital demanded by firms as soon as the transition begins. However,
during the transition aggregate savings (panel 3.6d) does not increase from the initial period. In
fact, they decline for the first few periods and only catch up as time goes by. The underlying
reason for this is consumption smoothing. Optimizing shoppers choose a pair of consumption and
savings to equalize marginal utility. Anticipating higher after-tax income, as shown by panel 3.6b,
they increase consumption in the first few periods of the transition and lower the stock of bonds.
In turn, the representative investor builds and supplies less capital. Additional capital demand
and reduced capital supplied combine to produce a large, short-run increase in the rental price of
capital, or the interest rate of the economy (panel 3.6e). It reaches 19% per year, four percent
more than its long-run value. This is a general equilibrium effect usually ignored by models that
highlight the parasite character of informal firms.
By equation (3.18), such increase in interest rate translates into lower bond prices and lower
discounting. As a result, the value of labor contracts to firms (V f , V i) declines in the short run,
and with it the value of posting vacancies (the left-hand side of (3.13)). By the free entry condition
(3.13), this leads to a reduction in the number of firms choosing to enter the market and an under-
shooting of the job-finding rate, which reaches 16.2% ten years after the repression of informality
begins, as stated by table 3.3, and even drops below 16% (panel 3.7c). During the initial years
of the transition, when the job market faces this slowdown, some informal firms still exist in the
economy (panel 3.7a) - recall that the government only impedes firms from forming new informal
contracts. Existing informal matches do not end in period t = 1. Therefore, at the same time that
job-finding rates undershoot their long-run values, transition rates to unemployment remain high
relative to the long-run. The end result is a short-run increase in the unemployment rate (panel
3.7b) that peaks at 18.5% (2.5 percentage points in excess of the initial steady state) in t = 5, less
than two years following the beginning of the repression.
As we move along the transition path, the increase in average income realizes and aggregate
household savings approach its long-run value. The capital supply curve shifts and its rental price
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declines steadily. As discounting increases, so does the discounted present value of firms’ profits.
More firms enter the market (relative to the short run slowdown) and job-finding rates rebound
(although they don’t achieve their pre-repression values). In addition, with an ever decreasing
measure of informal matches in the economy, average job duration increases. Increasing job-
finding rates and match duration lead to lower unemployment, which stabilizes at a level 0.5%
lower than the pre-repression level. Finally, panels 3.7d and 3.7e show the path of fiscal policy
variables. The income tax rate declines as less informal firms exist and the government expands its
tax base, also enlarged by the higher average firm revenue. Public consumption remains unaltered
by construction.
3.4.2 Welfare
As defined by equation (3.1), the households’ value J provides our measure of welfare. To
compare welfare in the baseline economy with welfare after the repression of informal activity, we
make use of the concept of consumption equivalent welfare gain, or simply consumption equiva-
lent. It is the value of m that solves the equation
E
∑
βtu((1−mt)c0t ) = E
∑
βtu(c1t ),
where superscript 0 indicates the baseline equilibrium consumption process, and superscript 1
indicates the after-policy equilibrium. Positive values of m mean that the household is better off
after the implementation of the policy studied. The main advantage of looking at consumption
equivalent measures of welfare instead of direct comparison of value functions is that it provides
an interpretation of welfare change in terms lifetime consumption. In practice, we calculate it using








To state our results, we fix net wealth positions a and aggregate consumption equivalents
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∫
mt(a, s)dxt. Figure 3.8 depicts our results. It contains four panels, each with two diagrams
that share a common horizontal axis representing different net wealth states a. The upper figure
plots consumption equivalents. The lower figure plots the distribution of households according
to their net wealth. The distinction between each panel lies in the time t we use to calculate the
averages and the group of households across which we aggregate. For example, panel 3.8a fo-
cus on period t = 1 (the short run) and households in all states, while panel 3.8b considers only
households at the unemployment states. The two lower panels follow the same logic, but calculate
consumption equivalents and distributions in the long-run steady state. Finally, in all cases, solid
lines represent averages among households with workers of the lowest skill type, whereas dashed
lines refer to households with workers of the highest skill type. We opt for looking only at workers
with the most extreme levels of skill to avoid polluting the pictures with too many curves. Inspec-
tion of consumption equivalents quickly reveals that almost all households are better off with the
repression of informality, both in the short and in the long run. Consumption equivalents are posi-
tive and economically significant. They often exceed 20% of pre-repression lifetime consumption.
This follows from the increase in expected lifetime income resulting from the fight against infor-
mal activity. The main force in the model going against these welfare gains is the combination of
lower job-finding rates (especially in the short run) and risk aversion. Risk averse households put
more weight on bad states of nature, namely unemployment, in which income drastically falls. As
informality vanishes, the occurrence of these states becomes more harmful as returning to employ-
ment is less likely. In this particular sense, the income distribution becomes riskier to households.
The pictures show this through two noticeable patterns. First, the welfare gains of the unemployed
are in all cases lower than the average taken across all households15. Second, welfare gains tend
to be relatively lower among households with low levels of net wealth, that is, households with
reduced capacity of (self) insuring against negative income shocks.
Of course, other forces play a role in determining welfare variation, such as changes in interest
15We take the change in welfare among households in unemployment states to be of particular relevance, since new
generations of workers enter the labor market unemployed. Of course, we can’t translate that in our framework, as we
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Notes: Each panel contains two figures. The upper figure plots consumption equivalents, as defined by equation (3.22), aggregated across a given
group of households. The lower figure plots the histogram of households’ wealth. The x-axis is common to the upper and lower figures and contains
net wealth positions a. In all plots, the solid line refers to aggregates acroos households of the lowest skill type h and the dashed line refers to
aggregates across the highest skill type h̄. Panel (a). Consumption equivalents and distribution as of period t = 1, calculated across households in
all states s. Panel (b). Consumption equivalents and distribution as of period t = 1, calculated across households in unemployment states. Panel
(c). Consumption equivalents and distribution in the long run, calculated across households in all states s. Panel (d). Consumption equivalents and
distribution in the long run, calculated across households in unemployment states.
Figure 3.8: Consumption Equivalents and Wealth Distributions
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rates, access to unemployment benefits and the distribution of households itself. For example, the
lower consumption equivalents in the long run (despite the negative general equilibrium effects
of the short run) can in part be attributed to the fact that informal workers receive no weight in
our averages (there are no informal workers left!). Short-run averages, on the other hand, place
significant weight on informal workers existing in the economy when the repression of informality
starts, which translates into high average consumption equivalents. In fact, this also accounts for
the fact that low skill households gain more in the short run, while high skill households gain more
in the long run, another interesting result.
In all, the main message of figure 3.8 is that, despite some perhaps undesirable general equilib-
rium effects that follow the repression of informality through the transition, as well as the elevated
income risk we highlight, most households experience a significant welfare improvement as a result
of the repression of informal labor activity.
3.4.3 The Open Economy Case
In this subsection, we consider the open economy case. Our choice of assuming a closed
economy in our baseline simulation follows from the evidence of weaker financial integration of
emerging market countries - where informality is more prevalent - with the international capital
market. Altering the framework to an open econommy model simply amounts to dropping the
last equilibrium condition in definition 1. The capital market does not necessarily clear anymore.
Instead, households and the representative investor trade bonds with the rest of the world. The
domestic economy is small in the sense that prevailing interest rates are exogenously determined
by the international market.
We stick to our baseline calibration discussed in section 3.3. We assume the interest rate is
15% yearly, following our target for the closed-economy case. Hence, the calibration leads to a
stationary equilibrium in which foreign debt
Foreign debtt+1 = Kt+1 − qt
(∫




is zero16. However, changes in economic policy now lead to fluctuations in foreign debt. Table 3.3
shows that the repression of informal activity does not affect interest rates too much in the long run
- additional capital demand is met by additional savings from households with more income. This
suggests that the open economy will not affect the long-term predictions of the model too much.
Short-term predictions however change considerably, as we shut down one of the major general
equilibrium channels. Figure 3.9 shows selected paths of the transition. To facilitate comparison,
we also plot the paths of our closed-economy benchmark (dashed lines). For this open-economy
case we increase the length of the transition path to 800 periods. In section C.1 of the appendix
you can find a table similar to 3.3 for this open economy simulation.
We can see from diagrams 3.9a and 3.9b that, without the sharp increase in interest rates from
the baseline simulation, the initial increase in unemployment rapidly converges to its long-run
value. With additional hours of labor employed in production, aggregate output follows a path
above the one we observe in the closed-economy case. Moving to the next two plots, despite the
reduced rate of unemployment and increased future income, aggregate consumption stays below
the baseline path. To a large extent, this is due to the lower returns on bond purchases (again,
interest do not increase in the short run), which also explains why aggregate savings do not increase
as much as in the closed-economy case. We again observe an increase in capital demand, as firms
apply more efficiency hours of labor. This time, however, it is met not only by domestic savings
but also by increased foreign debt (panel 3.9e), that reaches fifty percent of annual output.
In the long run, most variables experience changes similar to the closed-economy case. This is
expected, since the interest rate is roughly unchanged in the long-run equilibrium.
16Note that foreign debt is a predetermined variable. Therefore, (3.23) only holds after policy implementation. In
period t = 1, when the government announces the new policy, the value of foreign debt coincides with its initial steady
state level.
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(d) %∆ Aggregate Savings








(e) Foreign Debt to (annual) GDP
Notes: The figures show the equilibrium paths of different variables in the model, in the open economy case. We also plot the path of the variables
in the closed economy benchmark (same as in figures 3.6 and 3.7) The economy starts at the baseline steady state in period 0. In period one, φ (the
probability that unmatched firms have of drawing zero hiding ability) unexpectedly changes from 0.75 to 1, where it stays thereafter. The transition
takes 400 periods to reach the new steady state. To calculate foreign debt to GDP ratio (panel 3.9e), we multiply output by four, so that the ratio is
annualized.
Figure 3.9: Repression of Informality - Open Economy (Dashed = Closed Economy Benchmark)
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3.5 Policy Sensitivity
One of the key, and perhaps surprising, takeaways from our baseline simulation is that, despite
a considerable increase in unemployment rates and decrease in job-finding rates in the short run,
households are, for the most part, in favor of the repression of informality. In this section, we
explore how sensitive these predictions of the model are to different policies, all still aimed at
reducing the size of the informal sector to zero. Specifically, we consider two new policies. In
the first on, the government opts not to adjust the income tax rate along the transition path. In the
second one, we consider the effects of a partially anticipated policy: the government announces at
t = 1 that it will start the repression of informality at t = 20 (that is, after five years). Our baseline
calibration continues to be as in section 3.3.
3.5.1 Absence of Tax Adjusment
In our simulations of section 3.4, we assume that the government incurs in no additional costs
when tightening the enforcement of formal contracts. In reality, effective and widespread surveil-
lance might be far from free. In addition, the bureaucracy associated with registering and covering
more workers with the social security system might require application of more public funds. Even
if we ignore these costs, one might argue that political reasons prevent the additional tax revenue
accruing from the expansion of the formal sector from converting into lower income tax rates, as in
panel 3.7d. Given these considerations, this subsection presents the results from the repression of
informality in a context where the government adjusts its budget constraint (3.17) not by changing
the income tax rate τhh,t (which we keep in its baseline value of 9%), but rather by adjusting its
consumption of final goods Cgov,t.
Table 3.4 shows the results. You can also check transition paths in section C.1 of the appendix.
The last column of the table reveals that some of the transitory general equilibrium effects we see in
the baseline simulation now become persistent. In the long run, we have 0.9% higher interest rates
and 1.2% higher unemployment rate. Changes in average firm revenue and aggregate efficiency
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Variables Baseline One year Ten years Forty years Long run
t = 0 t = 4 t = 40 t = 80 t =∞
Interest rate (%) 15 16.3 17.4 16.2 15.9
Income tax rate (%) 9 9 9 9 9
Informality share (%) 32.9 13.7 0 0 0
Unemployment rate (%) 16 18.9 17.9 17.4 17.2
Market tightness (%) 100.1 50.5 42.5 46.2 47
Job-finding rate (%) 23.4 16.7 15.2 15.7 15.8
Transition unemployment (%) 4.5 4.1 3.3 3.3 3.3
Firm revenue - avg (%∆) 0 6.7 17.3 19.6 20.2
Firm revenue - entry (%∆) 0 58.3 55.2 54.2 55.2
Labor income - avg (%∆) 0 5.3 13.2 15.5 16
Labor income - entry (%∆) 0 40.7 38.7 38.3 38.9
Aggregates
Output (%∆) 0 6.4 21.3 24.7 25.4
Capital (%∆) 0 0.7 10.1 18.7 21
Efficiency Hours (%∆) 0 9.5 27.7 28.1 28.1
Savings (%∆) 0 -0.7 9.1 15.4 17
Sales tax revenue (%∆) 0 17.6 44 48 48.9
Income tax revenue ($) 24 28.7 34.9 35.9 36.1
Notes: The table shows the value of some endogenous variables and statistics in the transition path. In t = 0, the economy is in the baseline
steady state. In t = 1, the government starts the repression of informality: the value of φt changes to 1, where it stays for good. Throughout
the transition, the government adjusts its consumption level Cgov,t so that its budget constraint (3.17) holds with the income tax rate τhh,t of the
original calibration. The symbol "%∆" means that the variable is represented as percentage deviation from its baseline steady state value.
Table 3.4: Simulation of Informality Repression: No Adjustment of Tax Income
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hours reveal that the repression of informality drives unproductive firms out of the market, like
before. Nonetheless, the resulting effect on labor income is not so big anymore. Average labor
income still increases by 16% in the long run, a smaller variation than the one from table 3.3, 49%.
This is due not only to the mechanical effect of a constant (as opposed to lower) income tax rate,
but also due to the equilibrium effect of lower job-finding rates and higher unemployment. Workers
spend less time employed and, when employed, earn less on average. With less income than in
the baseline simulation, households increase their savings by a lower amount (17% vs 30%). Not
as funded, the representative investor then supplies less capital to firms that, like before, demand
more of it. Market clearing thus requires a higher level of interest rate in the long run. Essentially,
public spending crowds out private investment and consumption. Finally, we need to explain why
less firms enter the market. Such reduction follows from the fact that, without the lower taxes,
worker and firm now split a smaller pie. For the same state (e, z), the value of the matched firm is
now smaller. The increased interest rate also serves to reduce the present discouted value of firms’
profits V f . These changes reduce the value of vacancies and, by free entry, the number of firms
that search in the labor market.
Transition effects differ from long term ones in the same way as before. As aggregate savings
take longer to pick up than capital demand, the interest rate and the unemployment rate overshoot
their long-run values. However, in the case of the interest rate the size of the overshooting is not as
pronounced. One year after repression starts it increased by 1.3%, compared to 1.8% in the baseline
simulation. The cause of the difference is in the fact that savings (hence capital supply) do not
decrease as much as: -0.7% here, -1.5% in the baseline. Households do not increase consumption
as much because they do not antecipate as big of an increase in expected income as before.
What about welfare? Figure 3.10 is the counterpart of figure 3.8 for the case without tax
adjustment. It plots consumption equivalents (upper diagrams) and wealth distributions (lower
diagrams). It is still the case that, at the time of policy implementation, most households favor
it. However, now we can identify groups that don’t. Unemployed, low-wealth households are

























2 4 6 8 10 12 14






























2 4 6 8 10 12 14






























2 4 6 8 10 12 14






























2 4 6 8 10 12 14







Notes: Each panel contains two figures. The upper figure plots consumption equivalents, as defined by equation (3.22), aggregated across a given
group of households. The lower figure plots the histogram of households’ wealth. The x-axis is common to the upper and lower figures and contains
net wealth positions a. In all plots, the solid line refers to aggregates acroos households of the lowest skill type h and the dashed line refers to
aggregates across the highest skill type h̄. Panel (a). Consumption equivalents and distribution as of period t = 1, calculated across households in
all states s. Panel (b). Consumption equivalents and distribution as of period t = 1, calculated across households in unemployment states. Panel
(c). Consumption equivalents and distribution in the long run, calculated across households in all states s. Panel (d). Consumption equivalents and
distribution in the long run, calculated across households in unemployment states.
Figure 3.10: Consumption Equivalents and Wealth Distributions - No Adjustment of Tax Income
a cushion of savings. The same was true when the government adjusted down the income tax
rate, but now future gains fail to make up for the immediate losses. Just like our baseline case,
short-term gains are decreasing in worker skill level.
In the long run, gains are smaller compared to short run as we have less informal workers
and less employed workers (unlike the baseline). In fact, the average of consumption equivalents
becomes negative for zero-wealth households even when we take it across all low-skill households
(not only unemployed). As for the unemployed, we find negative averages for workers of all skill
levels and for wealth levels above the zero bound.
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3.5.2 Anticipated Policy
Our next simulation changes the timing of the model. A large-scale public program of targetting
informal contracts - as the one we simulate - is unlikely not to be, at least to some extent, anticipated
by economic agents. Our baseline exercise assumes a fully unanticipated policy change. Here, we
change that assumption. At t = 0, the economy is in the initial steady state. At t = 1, the
government announces that it will start to repress informal contracts starting at t = 20 (five years
following the announcement). Formally, we set φt = 1 for t ≥ 20, and calculate the general
equilibrium paths. In terms of fiscal adjustment, we return to the original assumption of changes
to the income tax rate that hold constant government consumption. Because we know that the
long-run steady state is the same one as the baseline, in the main text we only show the transition
paths, figures 3.11 and 3.12. You can check the counterpart of table 3.3 for the anticipated policy
in the appendix.
The figures show that the dynamics that follow the start of the fight against informality - period
t = 20 - resamble the baseline simulation. But the early years of the transition, after announcement
and prior to implementation, look different from before. During these initial five years, aggregate
efficiency hours and average after tax and transfers income decline (panels 3.11a and 3.11b). It
is still true that households anticipate future income gains and reduce their saving level immedi-
ately. The interest rate therefore starts to rise upon announcement (at a lower rate, since capital
demand is going down). Higher interest rates, like before, diminish the value of hired workers
to new firms. The free entry condition then leads to fewer firms entering the market and lower
job-finding rates. Exactly like the baseline case. However, unlike our baseline simulation, there is
no repression taking place immediately after the announcement. In fact, panel 3.12a shows that the
informality share increases before repression starts. Thus, low duration matches still populate the
job market. The combination of lower job-finding rates and the yet high average separation rates
(due to high informality) results in an increasing unemployment rate (panel 3.12b). In addition,
the absence of repression in the initial periods mutes the endogenous selection of productive firms
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(b) %∆ Avg. After-Tax Income







(c) %∆ Stock of Capital






(d) %∆ Aggregate Savings
















(f) %∆ Aggregate Output
Notes: The figures show the equilibrium paths of different variables in the model. With the exception of panel 3.11e, the curves draw percentage
difference between the value of each variable in time t and their baseline value. For example, panel 3.11c plots Kt/K0 − 1. The economy starts
at the baseline steady state in period 0. In t = 1, the government announces that, starting at period t = 20, it will repression informality: the value
of φt changes to 1, where it stays for good. The transition takes 400 periods to reach the new steady state. Panel 3.11b shows the average after tax
and transfers income. It includes unemployed workers. Panel 3.11e plots annualized interest rates.
Figure 3.11: Repression of Informality - Anticipated Policy
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(d) Income Tax Rate







(e) %∆ Government Consumption
Notes: The figures show the equilibrium paths of different variables in the model. In this simulation, the government does not adjust income taxes
in response to additional revenues raised from the end of informality. The economy starts at the baseline steady state in period 0. In t = 1, the
government announces that, starting at period t = 20, it will repression informality: the value of φt changes to 1, where it stays for good. The
transition takes 400 periods to reach the new steady state.
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Notes: Each panel contains two figures. The upper figure plots consumption equivalents, as defined by equation (3.22), aggregated across a given
group of households. The lower figure plots the histogram of households’ wealth. The x-axis is common to the upper and lower figures and contains
net wealth positions a. In all figures, the solid line refers to aggregates acroos households of the lowest skill type h and the dashed line refers to
aggregates across the highest skill type h̄. Panel (a). Consumption equivalents and distribution as of period t = 1, calculated across households in
all states s. Panel (b). Consumption equivalents and distribution as of period t = 1, calculated across households in unemployment states.
Figure 3.13: Consumption Equivalents and Wealth Distributions - Anticipated Policy
that characterizes the long run. This provides further explanation as to why aggregate efficiency
hours declines. Such decline also leads to an output contraction, something none of the previous
two simulations presented. Finally, the government increases income tax rate in the short run to
over 15%, which contributes to the increase in informality shares, contributes to the decline in
household income and reinforces the mechanism above. The additional tax revenues compensate
for the losses in sales/payoll taxes (the formal sector shrinks) and the additional expenditure with
unconditional transfers (unemployment increases).
Figure 3.13 plots the consumption equivalent diagrams for the anticipated policy. The long-run
equilibrium is the same, so we only show the numbers in the short run. At the time of the an-
nouncement, most households favor the repression, just like the baseline simulation and the case
of no tax adjustment. But now, we have a negative average consumption equivalent for low-wealth
households of all types. Like before, there are more net losers among the unemployed, but the
average consumption equivalent is already negative if we look at the population average. Basi-
cally, with the anticipated repression of informality, the policy is welfare-reducing for low wealth
households and welfare-enhancing for high wealth households. In all, 19.7% of households oppose
the repression of informality. Comparison betwen these numbers and consumption equivalents in
the unanticipated case highlights the importance (for welfare) of transition dynamics in the period
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between announcement and implementation. Such period features the main general equilibrium
"costs" of the repression of informality (higher unemployment, lower job-finding rates) that our
paper highlights. At the same time, the main benefit from the fight against informality, the change
in the profile of firm productivity, does not kick off until the policy is actually implemented.
3.6 Conclusion
Informality is arguably a rather impactful economic phenomenon, especially among develop-
ing countries. Supported by various arguments, directions to curb it often fill the discourse of
policymakers and professional economists alike. We believe that systematic studies of how such
policies would impact the economy should accompany the public debate. The main contribution of
this paper is to provide one instance of such studies. Our focus is on the examination of the general
equilibrium effects of an eventual repression of informal activity by the government, as well the
differences between the long and short run. We adapt the standard search-frictional labor market
environment - the workhorse model of modern macro-labor analysis - to reproduce three empirical
facts we identify from Brazilian household-level data. Perhaps the most striking of these facts
being that informal workers do not earn less than formal ones, if we look away from the region of
income close to the legal minimum wage. The main innovation of our search model we design to
address this fact. We allow firms to have heterogeneous abilities to hide from the government and
operate informally. This layer of heterogeneity allows the model to generate productive informal
firms in equilibrium while keeping the size of the informal sector empirically accurate.
The search model yields an endogenous, structural income process that we then feed into an
otherwise standard Aiyagari (1994) model of heterogeneous households and incomplete markets
that permits proper computation of general equilibrium effects, especially those that relate to inter-
est rates and the capital market. Many results emerge from the simulation. To a large extent, our
model agrees with the recent literature studying informality on its parasitic character. Less infor-
mal firms also mean more productive firms, on average, and thus higher labor income. However,
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we also observe a significant increase in interest rates in the short run, caused by a combination of
elevated capital demand and reduced supply. Both of these movements are directly connected to the
change in average firm productivity stemming from the repression of informal activity. Paired with
the increase in interest rate comes also a period of elevated unemployment. While one can point
out at these two effects as making the fight against informality too costly from a polical standpoint
or even undesirable, our welfare analysis suggests otherwise. In fact, we find that most households
gain from the repression, despite the increased risk that unemployment shocks represent.
We also examine two alternative policies, also aimed at removing informal activity from the
economy. In the first, the government fails to transfer back to households the additional tax pro-
ceeds accruing from the enlarged formal sector. We show that, in this case, the increase in interest
and unemployment rates occur not only in the short but also in the long run. In the second al-
ternative policy, economic agents anticipate the start of the fight against informality in five years.
Unemployment starts to increase upon announcement, and since unproductive firms continue to ex-
ist in the labor market, output declines prior to actual policy implementation. While it is still true
that most households benefit from the repression of informality with these two alternative policies,
the share of households that lose from it increases. They are often the low-wealth unemployed, of
any skill type, which highlights the role of income risk in the determination of welfare. In the case
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Appendix A: Chapter 1
A.1 Additional figures and tables
As stated in the main body, we normalize nominal income in the sample by the consumer price
index in the corresponding quarter. We obtain the consumer price index from the Brazilian national
statistical bureau website.17 The plot of the price level in our sample is presented in figure A.1.
The income variable is constructed by summing income from all sources for each individual,
adjusting by the price level (normalized to 2018-Q1) and dividing by 4 so as to be comparable with
US dollars (a conversion based on roughly the average nominal exchange rate for 2017-2020). We
report the summary statistics for that variable on table A.1. When we drop all categories but
(salaried) informal and formal, we get to the output on table A.2.
We report the time series for the formality share over occupation and education in figure A.2,
panels C.1 and A.2b. The composition of workers is shown in figure A.3.
The total number of workers by employment status (formal salaried, informal salaried, unem-
ployed) is reported on figure A.5. Figure A.6



























Figure A.1: Price level in Brazil after January 2012
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Quarter Sample size Mean Std. dev. Log Std. Dev. Median P25 P75
1 2012 Q1 211883 408.91 370.94 0.89 288.11 216.08 486.19
2 2012 Q2 215374 399.08 367.81 0.86 284.40 221.12 462.15
3 2012 Q3 215384 402.59 368.41 0.85 281.94 219.21 458.15
4 2012 Q4 212866 404.55 366.83 0.85 277.56 215.80 468.38
5 2013 Q1 212401 419.42 374.73 0.85 305.33 217.13 508.89
6 2013 Q2 218462 406.35 360.75 0.84 283.75 226.33 500.73
7 2013 Q3 219965 412.55 367.50 0.84 298.47 224.85 497.45
8 2013 Q4 220492 414.58 365.81 0.84 295.03 222.26 491.72
9 2014 Q1 219408 424.92 368.28 0.84 321.31 224.92 481.97
10 2014 Q2 221069 411.45 356.82 0.84 304.68 227.41 471.15
11 2014 Q3 223618 420.72 379.14 0.85 311.38 225.44 467.08
12 2014 Q4 223671 424.73 378.10 0.84 307.55 222.67 492.09
13 2015 Q1 218689 434.21 382.62 0.85 299.91 236.33 509.84
14 2015 Q2 220473 414.34 364.16 0.84 290.37 228.81 464.59
15 2015 Q3 219651 408.91 362.42 0.85 284.22 223.96 483.17
16 2015 Q4 216945 414.85 364.62 0.87 291.53 220.46 503.60
17 2016 Q1 213637 436.23 384.57 0.89 325.09 216.72 541.81
18 2016 Q2 216416 403.12 356.69 0.87 292.29 233.83 478.29
19 2016 Q3 213599 403.85 354.64 0.86 287.52 230.02 491.40
20 2016 Q4 212621 411.75 360.79 0.87 311.23 228.23 518.71
21 2017 Q1 206399 439.54 379.14 0.88 308.57 231.42 514.28
22 2017 Q2 209138 407.31 352.01 0.86 306.35 239.21 510.59
23 2017 Q3 210232 410.02 355.66 0.87 305.38 238.45 508.96
24 2017 Q4 209560 415.92 359.02 0.88 303.04 236.62 505.07
25 2018 Q1 204333 457.24 419.90 0.91 325.00 234.25 525.00
26 2018 Q2 205610 423.88 391.05 0.88 298.12 237.00 496.86
27 2018 Q3 209461 419.68 389.31 0.89 292.27 232.36 487.12
28 2018 Q4 208409 428.51 393.31 0.90 289.83 230.42 483.05
29 2019 Q1 202784 455.15 413.16 0.92 337.26 236.08 554.08
30 2019 Q2 207547 415.06 381.18 0.89 284.08 236.26 473.47
31 2019 Q3 207200 418.58 384.24 0.90 294.95 235.48 471.91
32 2019 Q4 205979 430.54 390.46 0.90 306.22 235.08 494.67
33 2020 Q1 179841 455.37 407.76 0.91 346.82 231.21 578.03
Notes: All statistics are unweighted. “Sample size” refers to the number of individuals satisfying the first set of filters
defined in the main body: above 18, below 68 with a reported positive income less than 2500 dollars per month. “Log
Std. Dev.” refers to the standard deviation of log income.
Table A.1: Income summary statistics by quarter
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Quarter Sample size Mean Std. dev. Log Std. Dev. Median P25 P75
1 2012 Q1 129565 380.34 312.13 0.74 288.11 224.01 432.17
2 2012 Q2 132699 361.08 297.06 0.71 284.40 221.12 426.60
3 2012 Q3 132953 362.76 298.05 0.70 281.94 219.21 422.91
4 2012 Q4 130625 367.53 298.64 0.70 277.56 215.80 416.34
5 2013 Q1 130339 385.24 310.12 0.71 288.37 230.02 441.04
6 2013 Q2 133410 369.90 291.38 0.69 278.74 226.33 417.28
7 2013 Q3 134955 373.92 297.81 0.69 281.89 224.85 431.12
8 2013 Q4 135045 377.21 298.93 0.69 295.03 222.26 426.16
9 2014 Q1 133847 390.40 303.23 0.69 295.61 232.63 449.84
10 2014 Q2 134685 375.18 288.60 0.68 282.69 227.41 439.74
11 2014 Q3 135642 380.97 304.85 0.69 295.81 225.44 435.94
12 2014 Q4 135141 383.65 304.85 0.68 307.55 222.67 445.34
13 2015 Q1 130921 398.05 311.73 0.68 299.91 236.33 449.86
14 2015 Q2 131608 376.62 291.58 0.67 290.37 228.81 435.56
15 2015 Q3 130211 372.25 291.60 0.68 284.22 223.96 426.33
16 2015 Q4 128140 386.93 304.42 0.71 293.77 220.46 447.64
17 2016 Q1 124646 414.45 328.52 0.73 325.09 238.40 487.63
18 2016 Q2 126782 370.67 287.25 0.69 292.29 233.83 425.15
19 2016 Q3 126071 370.43 287.47 0.69 287.52 230.02 418.21
20 2016 Q4 125510 383.38 301.00 0.72 311.23 228.23 453.87
21 2017 Q1 120911 417.02 325.49 0.74 308.57 240.94 514.28
22 2017 Q2 122996 375.21 288.53 0.71 306.35 239.21 434.00
23 2017 Q3 123491 378.26 291.54 0.72 305.38 238.45 445.34
24 2017 Q4 122854 388.63 301.35 0.74 303.04 236.62 454.56
25 2018 Q1 119031 429.31 356.74 0.77 325.00 238.50 500.00
26 2018 Q2 120775 385.05 314.93 0.73 298.12 237.00 447.18
27 2018 Q3 122862 379.05 310.91 0.74 292.27 232.36 438.41
28 2018 Q4 121651 392.65 321.60 0.75 289.83 230.42 483.05
29 2019 Q1 117667 426.56 350.66 0.78 313.17 240.42 481.80
30 2019 Q2 120841 376.65 304.73 0.73 284.08 236.26 437.96
31 2019 Q3 120946 380.25 310.99 0.75 283.15 235.48 448.32
32 2019 Q4 120306 395.63 322.34 0.75 306.22 235.08 471.11
33 2020 Q1 104383 427.42 349.51 0.78 323.69 240.23 508.66
Notes: All statistics are unweighted. Sample size is further restricted from table A.1 so as to filter out those who are
not one of salaried formal or salaried informal. “Log Std. Dev.” refers to the standard deviation of log income.











































Education Group High Low Medium
(b) Informality over time by educational attainment
Notes: All statistics are weighted. Sample contains only workers sastisfying the filters described in the data section in
formal or informal salaried jobs.




















Notes: All statistics are weighted. Sample contains only workers sastisfying the filters described in the data section in
formal or informal salaried jobs.
Figure A.3: Occupational composition over time
Below threshold Above threshold











































Notes: All statistics are weighted. Sample contains only workers sastisfying the
filters described in the data section in formal or informal salaried jobs.
Figure A.5: Breakdown of workforce by employment status
Unemployment
Informality share























Education = Low −0.048∗∗∗
(0.002)








Adjusted R2 0.025 0.020
Residual Std. Error 0.346 (df = 343384) 0.347 (df = 343386)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01





Education = Low 0.125∗∗∗
(0.003)








Adjusted R2 0.024 0.008
Residual Std. Error 0.399 (df = 343384) 0.402 (df = 343386)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01





Education = Low 0.014∗∗∗
(0.0004)








Adjusted R2 0.005 0.005
Residual Std. Error 0.163 (df = 1822103) 0.163 (df = 1822105)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01





Education = Low 0.030∗∗∗
(0.001)








Adjusted R2 0.015 0.014
Residual Std. Error 0.267 (df = 816620) 0.267 (df = 816622)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
































Figure A.8: Fixed-effect coefficients with sample sizes
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Appendix B: Chapter 2
B.1 Tables and Figures
B.1.1 Simulation: the behavior of targeted moments
Calibration
Moment Data γ1 = 0 γ1 = −0.2 γ1 = −0.8 γ1 = −1.6
Average unemployment 0.146 0.1413 0.1423 0.1412 0.1508
Unemployment autocorrelation 0.907 0.9206 0.9207 0.9173 0.8878
Unemployment volatility 0.037 0.029 0.0283 0.0263 0.0215
Share of informal workers 0.303 0.3087 0.3114 0.3147 0.3014
Separation probability f 0.028 0.0302 0.0302 0.0295 0.0366
Separation probability i 0.089 0.0723 0.0721 0.0711 0.0734
Interquartile ratio TFP f 0.703 0.6858 0.6856 0.6906 0.6419
Tightness 1.0 1.0204 1.0188 1.0213 1.0185
Implied severance pay 3.85 3.8 3.79 3.81 3.78
Sharpe ratio 0.1844 0.1871 0.1871 0.1872 0.1872
Risk free rate volatility 0.0034 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041 0.0041
Table B.1: Targeted moments: simulations
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Appendix C: Chapter 3
C.1 Additional Plots and Tables
In this section of the appendix we show additional plots and tables of the data and model.
C.2 Transition matrix of household state
In this section of the appendix, we show how to calculate the transition matrix g(s′|s) for the
shopper’s exogenous state s = (d, e, z;h), given a steady-state equilibrium in the labor market. So,
assume we have in hands a pair of firm value functions V ft and V it , workers’ value function W
f
t ,
W it , W
n
t as well as the market tightness θt(h) and the associated vacancy-filling rate pt(h).
We assume a discrete support for the distributions of hiding ability e and productivity z. Be-
cause the worker’s type is constant, we start by setting gt((., h′)|(., h)) = 0 whenever h′ 6= h. To
keep notation light, we omit type h hereafter. We also establish an easier notation for the remaining
states. Let i(e, z) denote the state in which the worker is informally employed by a firm with hiding
ability/productivity pair (e, z); let f(z) denote the state in which the worker is formally employed
by a firm with productivity z; let u denote unemployment without benefits and ub unemployment
receiving the insurance payment.
We start by noticing that the unemployment insurance benefit lasts a single period: receivers
can’t transition to another period of unemployment insurance payment: gt(ub|ub) = gt(ub|u) = 0.
Any unemployed worker transition to the unemployment without benefit state if he or she fails to
find a match when the labor market opens (recall that the job-finding rate coincides with the rate
at which workers transition from unemployment to employment):
gt(u|ub) = gt(u|u) = 1− pθt.
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Variables Baseline One year Ten years Forty years Long run
t = 0 t = 4 t = 40 t = 80 t =∞
Interest rate (%) 15 15 15 15 15
Income tax rate (%) 9 -5.7 -18.8 -19.2 -19.3
Informality share (%) 32.9 12.2 0 0 0
Unemployment rate (%) 16 17.4 15.4 15.5 15.4
Market tightness (%) 100.1 73.8 63.3 62.7 62.8
Job-finding rate (%) 23.4 19.2 17.6 17.5 17.5
Transition unemployment (%) 4.5 3.9 3.2 3.2 3.2
Firm revenue - avg (%∆) 0 9.5 23.5 24.6 24.8
Firm revenue - entry (%∆) 0 57.5 57.7 57.7 57.7
Labor income - avg %∆) 0 21.8 47.6 49.1 49.3
Labor income - entry (%∆) 0 61 76.4 76.9 77
Aggregates
Output (%∆) 0 11.4 32 32.8 33
Capital (%∆) 0 11.4 32 32.8 33
Efficiency Hours (%∆) 0 11.5 32 32.8 33
Savings (%∆) 0 -2.5 2.5 11.2 29.7
Sales tax revenue (%∆) 0 24 56.4 57.7 57.9
Income tax revenue ($) 24 -18.7 -75.1 -77.3 -77.7
Notes: The table shows the value of some endogenous variables and statistics in the transition path, in the open economy case. In t = 0, the
economy is in the baseline steady state. In t = 1, the government starts the repression of informality: the value of φt changes to 1, where it stays
for good. Throughout the transition, the government adjusts its consumption level Cgov,t so that its budget constraint (3.17) holds with the income
tax rate τhh,t of the original calibration. The symbol "%∆" means that the variable is represented as percentage deviation from its baseline steady
state value.
Table C.1: Simulation of Informality Repression: Open Economy
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Variables Baseline One year Ten years Forty years Long run
t = 0 t = 4 t = 40 t = 80 t =∞
Interest rate (%) 15 15 20.7 17.1 15
Income tax rate (%) 9 9.9 -5.2 -14.8 -19.3
Informality share (%) 32.9 33.4 0.6 0 0
Unemployment rate (%) 16 16.3 18.6 16.5 15.5
Market tightness (%) 100.1 93.6 41.6 54.1 62.7
Job-finding rate (%) 23.4 22.7 14.9 16.6 17.5
Transition unemployment (%) 4.5 4.5 3.3 3.2 3.2
Firm revenue - avg (%∆) 0 0.2 12 20.4 24.7
Firm revenue - entry (%∆) 0 0.4 56 55.8 57.7
Labor income - avg (%∆) 0 -0.7 21.6 39.9 49.3
Labor income - entry (%∆) 0 0 56.3 69.6 76.9
Aggregates
Output (%∆) 0 -0.4 14.7 26.8 32.9
Capital (%∆) 0 -0.3 -7.7 16.3 32.9
Efficiency Hours (%∆) 0 -0.4 28.1 32.4 33.2
Savings (%∆) 0 -1.3 -2.3 17.1 29.6
Sales tax revenue (%∆) 0 -1 35.7 50.5 57.8
Income tax revenue ($) 24 26.1 -18.4 -57.3 -77.6
Notes: The table shows the value of some endogenous variables and statistics in the transition path. In t = 0, the economy is in the baseline steady
state. In t = 1, the government announces that, starting at period t = 20, it will repression informality: the value of φt changes to 1, where it stays
for good. Throughout the transition, the government adjusts the income tax rate τhh,t so that its budget constraint (3.17) holds with the baseline
equilibrium value of government consumption Cgov . The symbol "%∆" means that the variable is represented as percentage deviation from its
baseline steady state value.
























Figure C.1: Informality over time by occupational group
Below threshold Above threshold






















Figure C.2: Earnings differential by occupation over time
Transition to employment depends on the choice of new firms on whether to offer formal or infor-
mal contracts on each state (e, z).
gt(f(z)|u) = gt(f(z)|ub) = pθt1(e,z)∈Zft
Gt(e, z)
Gt(Z)
gt(i(e, z)|u) = gt(i(e, z)|ub) = pθt1(e,z)∈Zit
Gt(e, z)
Gt(Zt)
This completes the statement of transitions from unemployment states.
Transitions from employment are less straighforward as we need to take into account the
worker’s chance of transitioning to a new job from on-the-job search. We start by noting that
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(a) %∆ Efficiency Hours of Labor








(b) %∆ Avg. After-Tax Income






(c) %∆ Stock of Capital








(d) %∆ Aggregate Savings














(f) %∆ Aggregate Output
Notes: The figures show the equilibrium paths of different variables in the model. In this simulation, the government does not adjust income taxes
in response to additional revenues raised from the end of informality. With the exception of panel C.3e, the curves draw percentage difference
between the value of each variable in time t and their baseline value. For example, panel C.3c plotsKt/K0−1. The economy starts at the baseline
steady state in period 0. In period one, φ (the probability that unmatched firms have of drawing zero hiding ability) unexpectedly changes from 0.75
to 1, where it stays thereafter. The transition takes 400 periods to reach the new steady state. Panel C.3b shows the average after tax and transfers
income. It includes unemployed workers. Panel C.3e plots annualized interest rates.
Figure C.3: Repression of Informality - No Adjustment of Tax Rate
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(d) Income Tax Rate









(e) %∆ Government Consumption
Notes: The figures show the equilibrium paths of different variables in the model. In this simulation, the government does not adjust income taxes
in response to additional revenues raised from the end of informality. The economy starts at the baseline steady state in period 0. In period one,
φ (the probability that unmatched firms have of drawing zero hiding ability) unexpectedly changes from 0.75 to 1, where it stays thereafter. The
transition takes 400 periods to reach the new steady state.
Figure C.4: Repression of Informality - No Adjustment of Tax Rate
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gt(.|u) gives not only the probability distribution of states to workers coming from unemployment
but also of workers that lose their job at the end of a period and enter the market in the next period.
We can thus recycle the use of gt(.|u). For instance, formal workers transition to the unemployment
with benefit state ub if they lose their job (probability λf ) and fail to find a new one (probability
gt(u|u)):
gt(ub|f(z)) = λfgt(u|u)
gt(u|i(e, z)) = λigt(u|u)
(a similar reasoning stands for informal workers transitioning to unemployment without benefit
state u). Also, gt(u|f(z)) = gt(ub|i(e, z)) = 0.
Consider now the probability that the employed worker remains on his or her current state, say
f(z) (the case i(e, z) is analogous). As a convention, we assume that an employed worker finding
a competing job offer decides to switch only if he or she strictly prefers the new offer. Therefore,
in matching with a firm at the exact same state as his or her current employer, the workers opts to
stay in the current position (this choice is obviously inconsequential for the model). To transition
from f(z) to the same state f(z), the worker can then either lose the current job but find a similar
one in the following period or simply stay at the current position (if no better match is found):
gt(f(z)|f(z)) = λfgt(f(z)|u) + (1− λf )(1− pθt)
+ (1− λf )
pθt
Gt(Zt)
Gt({(e′, z′) ∈ Zft |W
f




+ (1− λf )
pθt
Gt(Zt)
Gt({(e′, z′) ∈ Zit |W
f
t (z) ≥ W it (e′, z′)}).
Our worker at f(z) can also transition to a new formal job f(z′). That can happen either with an
exogenous separation in between or through on-the-job search. The transition from employment
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requires W f (z′) > W f (z):
gt(f(z










The last case we need to consider is the transition from a formal job f(z) to an informal job i(e, z).
The reasoning is the same as the previous case.
gt(i(e








We are done. The transition matrix for a worker employed with an informal contract is analogous




C.3 The Investor’s Problem
In this section we describe formally the investor’s environment and provide a proof for propo-
sition 3.1. To simplify things, we assume the equity of existing firms is packaged by a fund of
firms responsible for posting all vacancies in the economy. The investor purchases shares of the
fund of firms. The supply of such shares is one in all periods. Shareholders receive as dividends
the sum of matched firms’ profits discounted by the cost of posting new vacancies V Ct.
In any given period t, the investor sells Bt bonds to households at a price qt and uses the
proceeds to purchase Xt+1 shares of the fund of firms, each at a price Qt − DIVt (that is the
value of future stream of payments), or Kt+1 units of capital. Note that Xt+1 and Kt+1 are both
predetermined. Therefore, the investor’s balance sheet constraint is
Kt+1 +Xt+1 (Qt −DIVt) = qtBt. (C.24)
In the following period t+ 1, the investor supplies capital to firms, and receives rental payment
(rt + δ)Kt+1 plus the now depreciated capital (1 − δ)Kt+1, which amounts to (1 + rt+1)Kt+1.
Investment in shares of the fund of firms yields dividends Xt+1DIVt+1 plus the t + 1 value of the
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shares, Xt+1 (Qt+1 −DIVt+1). They sum up to Xt+1Qt+1. Finally, the investor must repay period
t debt Bt. The difference between investment payoffs and debt repayment is consumed away:
Cinv,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)Kt+1 +Xt+1Qt+1 −Bt. (C.25)
The representative investor’s problem then is to maximize (C.25) by choosing a portfolio (Kt+1, Xt+1, Bt)
that satisfies the balance sheet constraint (C.24).
The following proposition is critical in solving the investor’s problem.
Proposition C.2 Aggregate dividends DIVt satisfy the following equation:
Qt = DIVt + qtQt+1 (C.26)
Proof. We prove that aggregate dividends in a single market h satisfy
DIVt(h) =
∫
V ft (z, h)dE
f
t (z, h) +
∫














. The proposition then follows. Let Ēft = E
f
t (Z;h) be the share of h-type workers in the formal
sector, and define Ēi similarly. To simplify notation, we fix h and omit it from the proof hereafter.
The construction of the transition matrix in section C.2 of this appendix implies that the following
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relationship holds:
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]
(C.27)
The two equations simply contain the law of motion for the measure of workers in each employ-
ment state.
Total dividends are the difference between total period profits acquired by matched firmsDIV F
and total cost with new vacanciesDIV V . We first calculate the former. Let us call πf (z) the period
profit of a formal firm at state z, and the same be for πi(ez). Firm value function (3.6) implies that





































































The aggregate spending with vacancy costs then satisfies the following equations:
























































































The first equality is simply the definition of aggregate spending in vacancy costs. The second
equality uses (3.15). The third one replaces the free-entry condition. The fourth equality replaces
the definition (3.16) of ρf and ρi. The last equality replaces the integrated version of equation
(C.27).
After cancelling out the repeated terms, the result follows:
DIVt(h) = DIV
F
t (h)−DIV Vt (h)
=
∫
V ft (z, h)dE
f
t (z, h) +
∫












Note that proposition C.2 guarantees that, ex-ante, equity investment at period t guarantees a
return of 1/qt. In the period of an MIT shock, the ex-post return might differ as Qt+1 jumps to
different level.
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By replacing (C.24) and (C.26) in the objective (C.25), we find a new expression









If qt < (1+rt+1)−1, the investors would not invest in capital (that is, transform final goods acquired
from selling bonds to the households into capital). If qt > (1 + rt+1)−1, the investor would supply
an infinite amount of bonds in period t and supply an infinite amount of capital in t+1. If condition
(3.18) holds, the investor becomes indifferent between equity and capital investment, as both yield
the same return. This proves the first claim in proposition 3.1.
In being indifferent with respect to the holdings of fund of firms shares, the investor chooses
Xt = 1, so that market clears. Replacing it in equation (C.25) together with constraint (C.24)
yields the consumption expression found in the text of the proposition:




Unlike (C.28), the expression above holds even in initial MIT shock periods.
Finally, replacing Xt = 1 and (C.26) in (C.24) yields the proposition’s equation for the in-
vestor’s balance sheet
Kt+1 + qtQt+1 = qtBt.
Note that this expression only holds in non-MIT shock periods. If anticipated and realized Qt+1
differ, the expression above only holds if we use anticipated Qt+1.
C.4 Details of the numerical solution
We present the discretization process as well as the algorithms we use to generate our results.
All numerical computations we perform using the Julia programming language. For data manipu-
lation, we use R.
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C.4.1 Grids
We discretize firm productivity with nz = 50 grid points. We start by using Tauchen’s method
to discretize a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σz, with nz−1 points. We
use three standard deviations to each side of the distribution. We take the exponential of the nz− 1
grid points and add zero to the grid, thus forming a new grid with a total of nz points. Tauchen’s
method gives the probability of each of the nz − 1 original points. The discrete probability of




where Z = {z1 = 0, z2, . . . , znz} is our productivity grid.
Next, we discretize Ge. The first step is to discretize a Beta distribution. We start with 200
equally-spaced points between zero and 0.9999. To each point we calculate the corresponding
quintiles of a Beta distribution with parameters ν and one. These 200 quintiles yield 199 mid points
(the points halfway between each two quintiles). To each of these points we assign a probability of
1/199. The second step performs the mixture. We start by adding the zero to the 199 points, and
end with a 200-point grid E for hiding abilities. The probability of zero is φt. The probability of
any other point is (1− φt)(1/199).
In the numerical solution, we do not work with the distribution G for the pair (e, z). Instead,
we use an equivalent distribution Ĝ for the pair (z, ez). The discretized grid for both entries of the
tuple is the productivity grid Z . So, we start with Ĝ(e, ez) = 0, and do the following iteration. For
each pair of zi ∈ Z and ej ∈ E , we update Ĝ:
G(zi, z(ejzi)) = G(zi, z(ejzi)) + (1− ω(ejzi))Gz(zi)Ge(ej)
G(zi, z̄(ejzi)) = G(zi, z̄(ejzi)) + ω(ejzi)Gz(zi)Ge(ej)
where we choose z(ejzi) ∈ Z and z̄(ejzi) ∈ Z such that they are consecutive to each other and
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z(ejzi) ≤ ejzi ≤ z̄(ejzi). The weight ω(ejzi) guarantees that the we distribute the probability
mass proportinally between the two bounds:
ejzi = (1− ω(ejzi))z(ejzi) + ω(ejzi)z̄(ejzi).
For the asset grid, we start with a choice of grid size na = 50, an upper bound ā = 1000 and a
parameter of non-linearity nl ≥ 1. The first point of the grid is a1 = 0 (following the no-borrowing
constraint). We place the following points of the grid using the formula
ai = ai−1 +
ā− ai−1
(na − i+ 1)nl
.
This guarantees ana = ā. Higher values of the non-linearity parameter nl concentrate more points
on the lower end of the asset grid. We set nl = 2.
C.4.2 The Search Block
The search block contains three main algorithms: search backward iteration, search state up-
date and fiscal update.











t−1, Ut−1, Ft−1 as well as rt and public policy variables φt,
τhh,t:
1. Compute discounting qt using (3.18);
2. Calculate wages wft and wit using (3.11) and (3.12);
3. Calculate period t values functions using (3.6), (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9);
4. Calculate period t market tightness using (3.15) and the job finding rate using (3.13);
5. Calculate ρft and ρit through (3.16);
6. Compute yt using (3.19) and the transition matrix gt(s′|s).




t+1, rt+1, φt+1, the current
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state variables Eft−1, E
i
t−1, Ut−1 as well as the transition matrix gt:
1. Update the distribution of workers Eft , Eit and Ut using the transition matrix gt and the
current distribution Eft−1, E
i
t−1 and Ut−1;
2. Calculate the anticipated next-period market tightness θt+1 using the free entry condi-
tion (3.13) and the associated measure of new firms Ft using (3.15).
Fiscal Update Given current period wage rates wft , wit, distribution of workers E
f
t , Eit , Ut and
price of bonds qt, either:
• Given government consumption Cgov,t, update the income tax rate τhh,t using (3.17); or
• Given the income tax rate τhh,t, update government consumption Cgov,t using (3.17).
The difference between the choices in the fiscal update algorithm defines whether government
adjusts income taxation (section 3.4) or public consumption (subsection 3.5.1).
C.4.3 The Household Block
The household block contains three main algorithms: household backward iteration and house-
hold state update.
Household Backward Iteration Given next-period variables Jt+1 and gt+1, the current period











We use the endogenous-grid method in this step.
Household State Update Given the state distribution xt−1 and households’ next-period asset choice
a′t, compute xt using (3.20).
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C.4.4 Steady States and Transitions
To find a steady state, we start with a guess for the value functions, states variables, market
tightness and interest rate. We run the five algorithms above in the order they are presented. After
each iteration i, we calculate capital supply Ki using (3.21). We can also calculate aggregate hours
of production Li using the distribution of workers. The first-order condition for capital demanded
by firms A(k/`)α−1 = r + δ then provides the interest rate for the next iteration ri+1, as well as
value functions, states, and market tightness. Our tolerance for the approximation error is of four
decimal digits.
To compute the transition path, we start with an initial steady state, which holds at t = 0, a
transition length T and a final steady state which the economy reaches by period T . We then iterate
the following three algorithms.
Backward Iteration Starting from the final steady state at T , use the search backward iteration
and household backward iteration algorithms to find the path for value functions, wages and
market tightness from t = T − 1 to t = 1.
State Update Starting with the aggregate state from the initial steady state, update from t = 1 to
t = T − 1 using the search state update.
Update Fiscal/Interest From t = 1 to t = T − 1, update the public policy parameter of choice
using the fiscal update algorithm and the interest rate path as in the case of a steady state.
We iterate the three algorithms above in the space of sequences until convergence of the aggre-
gate state xt, Ft.
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